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Alumni - Hello Again
The Barrister members hope you
enjoyed the last edition - and enjoy
this one, too! This edition has many
topical issues written by faculty and
students. We again ask alumni to
considersubmittingarticlesforpublication or 'republication.'
Unfortunately, your Alumni
Board of Directors voted not to
allow The Barrister to 'piggy-back'
with routine alumni mailings -even
though there would be no addi
tional costs incurred by the alumni
association. As such, TheBarrister
had to obtain its own bulk rate per
mit and then pay the postage to send
each alumni their copy.
So we ask that you seriously con
sider an ad in The Barrister and/or
make a tax-deductible donat ion to
the non-profit The Barrister. Our
address is:
The Barrister - Editor
c/o NCCU - School of Law
1801 Fayetteville Street
Durham, NC 27707

Celebration of a
Pioneer
Last November the Student Bar
Association held a celebration for
Dean Emeritus Daniel G. Sampson.
Members of the administration, fac
ulty, student body -both present and
former, and friends paid tribute to
this uniquely gifted legal scholar,
law administrator, professor, and
human being. A complete account
ing of The Celebration has been in
cluded in this edition of The Barris
ter.
(Continued on page 2)

Statutory
Interpellations
The Law School Administration
was non-responsive to the ABA ar
ticle in the last edition of The Barris
ter and students sent a petition for
the ABA to look into the school's
apparent violation of ABA Stan
dards. For an update - see pg. 9.
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TRIBUTE TO GREATNESS: THURGOOD MARSHALL
1908-1993
The October 1992 Fordham Inw Review1 was a
composite of the original tribute to Justice Thurgood
Marshall, sponsored by Fordham Law School and the
Stein Institute O/IMW and Ethics, in March 1992. The
March 1992 program was titled "Brown v. Board of
Education and its Legacy" and had a host of acclaimed
jurists, scholars, and civil rights litigators, who made
oral presentations citing the depth andbreadth of Brown-2
Those March 1992 presentations were revamped for
the Fordham October 1992 publication and now The
Barristeris providing a brief overview from that publica
tion. Hopefully, The Barrister's offering will not only underscore the greatness of the man - but also "wet
your appetite'and move you to peruse the complete series offered in the October 1992 publication.3
(Continued on page 4)

CHANCELLOR CHAMBERS: UPDATE
Unfortunately, we , the la w st udents of No rth C arolina C entral Un iversity, ha ve t o sa y "w elcome ab oard" to C hancellor
Chambers i n t his pu blication, r ather th an in person. Although numerous attempts w ere made to h ave Chancellor C hambers
respond to a rather brief qu estionnaire sent at his request, and r epeated attempts to schedule a meeting to discuss law students'
concerns, Chancellor Chambers' busy schedule has prevented any dialogue. An other attempt to meet has been scheduled for early
March (after this edition w ent 'to press').
Even though students have not 'seen' the Chancellor at the Law School, his presence is being felt. As many of y ou know, by
way of re ading the Law School Weekly, the Chancellor has appointed a 'blue-ribbon' advisory committee to review "the overall
reaction of the Law School." In a n attempt to determine the scope of the committee; when and if the committee will meet with
students; why there aren't 'recent' alumni on the committee; why there are no 3L's on the committee - we met with the chairperson
- Professor Daye of the UNC-CH School of L aw. The following p araphrases the issues discussed at t hat meeting:
Q: What is the scope of the Committee?
A: We have been asked by Chancellor Chambers to advise him about certain law aspects - such as; the administration; faculty;
curriculum; school's mission. Fu rther, the goal of the Committee is to be in a position to determine facts and present salient
information and data which will enable the Chancellor to effect the initiatives he wished to employ at the School of Law.
Q: Will students be able to meet w ith the Committee?
A: Yes -1 just spoke to the Dean today and she will have sign-up sheets posted for law students. Further, the Committee will
not be looking at areas that are within the jurisdiction of the faculty of a dministration - n amely, w e w ill not attempt t o
ascertain whether or not the C-rule is 'valid'; we will not deal w ith whether having a required attendance policy is 'proper'
- because w e are not in a position to evaluate the information and data after a one-day visit. Ag ain, the scope of our mission
is to provide data and information to the Chancellor; we are not evaluating the data.
Q: Does that mean the Committee would not pass on information about student concerns regarding these matters:
A: No - i f w e had n umerous complaints about any on e area th en w e w ould p ass th at d ata along to t he Chancellor. M ore
importantly, the Chancellor is lo oking for t hings th at will as sist him in getting m ore State and F ederal f unds. So, for
example, if students report that having to work 10-20 hours a week meant they were unable to effectively do their course
work - t hat w ould b e helpful to the Chancellor. Again, th at is n ot to say t he Committee or the Chancellor w ill ign ore
complaints. So , I h ope to see you, and the editor of the Law Journal, SBA representatives, members of other NCCU law
school organizations, any student who signs up to meet w ith us, faculty and a dministration on M arch 5,1993.
By: WJO

(Editor's Note: On March 2, Chancellor Chambers met with The Barrister reporter L.Wells and this editor. - Too late for this edition.)
(Continued on page 2)

CELEBRATION OF A PIONEER
Honorable, dedicated, knowledgeable, philo
sophical, poetic and learned are only a few ofthe
adjectives which are used to describe our own
Dean andProfessorEmeritus DanielG.Sampson.
Because Dean Sampson has exhibited the high
est degree of dedication and concern for the
students, the Student Bar Association sponsored
an appreciation celebration; not only to show our

Dean Sampson honored at S£.A.
celebration during Homecoming 1992.
appreciation and express our affection for Dean
Sampson, but also to give all students a senseof
this fine human being.
The appreciation celebration was held the
evening of November 5,1992 at the law schooL
Students and faculty were instrumental in mak
ing the celebration a greatsuccess. The masterof
ceremonies was 2L vicepresident Doug Simon.
VersheniaBallance, lLclasspresident, presented
the w elcome. Dean Mary Wright read Dean
Sampson's biographical sketch. ChristaTidwell,
3L president, introduced the guest speakers. On
the roster of speakers were past and present
students as well as friends of Dean Sampson:
Attorney Victor Boone, Executive Director of
East Central Community Legal Services; Mrs.
LeMarquis DeJarmon,wife of thelate lawschool
Dean LeMarquis DeJarmon andpast president of
theNational Barrister's Wives; AttorneyAllyson
Duncan, North CarolinaUtilities Commissioner,
Charles Hines, 3L; and William Olynick, 3L.
Jerry Smith, 3L, rendered musical selections
before and after the program. Stephanie Hand,
3L, serenaded Dean Sampson with an appropri
ate s ong entitled, "You are My Hero". As a
memento of the celebration, the Student Bar
Association and Phi Alpha Delta law fraternity
presented Dean Sampson with p laques for outstandingservicetothelawschool. Thiswonderful
occasion was brought to a close with a reception

in t he law school lobby. Stephanie Hand and
Lalita Wells (both 3Ls) catered the reception.
During the ceremony, it was noted that Dean
Sampson became a member of our law school
family in 1950. He served as Dean from 1965
until 19 69. Under his administration, th e law
school's first legal fraternity was started (Phi
Alpha Delta); the JD degree replaced the LLB;
the Law Journal was started; and The Banister
was started.1 In 1969, Dean Sampson was ap
pointed legal assistant to Dr. A.N. Whiting, the
fourth president of North Carolina Central Uni
versity.2
Speakers also noted their personal and close
relationships with Dean Sampson. One spoke of
a Central law student whowas not able to return
for academic reasons a nd that Dean Sampson
"vouched" for the student—thereby providing
the caliber of recommendation necessary for the
student to be able to enter another law school.
Another speaker spoke of Dean Sampson's un
ending and continued assistance; he had worked
with her each and every day of the summer for
countless hours, so that she would be better
equipped to pass the bar exam. Yet anotherspoke
about his seemingly, unending wealth of knowl
edge —not just el gal knowledge, but knowledge
about lifeand hiscapacity to share hisvast wealth
of that knowledge, without superimposing his
own beliefs and ideas as fret. Occasionally, he
would share his concerns and questions with the
understanding itwas pure dicta. A formerstudent
told a story that underscores t he strength and
humor of this gentle person. During a criminal
law class, Dean Sampson was questioning this

S.B.A. V.P. & Pres. Tonya Roberts &
Teresa Walker "join in" celebration.
person about the facts of a particular case. De
scribing the facts, this person remarked that it
appeared the defendant might have robbed the
plaintiff's house; asked again, the person re
peated his remarks, whereupon Dean Sampson,
chuckling and withoutany attempt to belittlethe
person,said: "youcannotrobahouse-buiglarize
perhaps, butnotrob." Another speaker reminded
2

the audience thatall students and facultyas well,
should takeadvantage of this uniquely gifted and
inspired person. She reminded us that Dean
Sampson has taught virtually all the courses at
Central's law school- from agency to torts (and
everything in between - except Tax- it was of
fered that to teach tax you need someone unique
and Professor Sampson suggested h e was not
THAT unique). During a moment reserved for
reflections from the audience, Professor T.M.
Ringer addedabitofhumorto thecelebration. In
his cross examination persona,Professor Ringer
relentlessly questioned Dean Sampson about his
days asan undergraduate at Morehouse College.
Dean Ringer inquired into the occasion where

Friends, colleagues, and students listening
to the tributes to Dean Emeritus Sampson.
Dean Sampson was given to keep an eye on his
roommate's girlfriend. Dean Sampson kept a
very good eyeon his roommates'girl - theyfell in
love and he later married his roommate's exgirlfriend. From that union three children were
bom. Two of their children are practicing law
yers and one is apracticing doctor.
Many students are not aware thatin 1965 Gov
ernor Dan Moore tried to close the law school
believing it was not cost effective. It was Dean
Sampson who developed "The Sampson Paper"
which documented the detrimental impact the
closing of the law school w ould have on the
surrounding community. Dean Sampson's po
sition was finally accepted and the law school
survived Governor Moore's attack.2 For thelast
forty-two years, Dean Sampson has been instru
mental inshaping theCentral law studentinto the
bestlawyersheorhecan become.Dean Sampson
has had an impact upon more African-American
attorneys in the Southeast thanany other profes
sor.4 He is everything a lawprofessor should be
to any aspiring lawyer. He is always concerned
about students' understanding of the law. He is
always patient, and he always expresses his
passion for fairness in the law.
Students are encouraged to takethe courses he
(Continued on page 3)

Celebration Of A Pioneer
(Continued from page 2)
teaches (debtor/creditor and advance torts). My
experience as a law strident has been deeply
enhanced by having had Dean Sampson as a
teacher, asa guide. Iwouldsuggestthateachand
every student consider taking a course with this
truly remarkable person.

By: Ton ja Roberts
ENDNOTES
1.

North Carolina Central University School of Law.
Biographical Sketch of Dean and Professor Emeritus
Darnel G. Sampson.

2. Id.
3. Id
4. "Moving to New Horizons", volume 3, August 1984.

Journey With A
"Guide"
This isan edited offering ofa recentlypublished
article from a former"The Barrister" publication,
to give you a further sense of this dynamic
individual.
After I had arranged my structural scheme
and was capable of discarding many data
that were superfluous to my initial effort cf
uncovering the cogency of his teachings, it
became clear to me that they had an
internal cohesion, a bgical sequence that
enabled me to view the entire phenomenon
in a light that dispelled the sense of bizarreness which has the mark of all 1 had
experienced. It was obvious to me then
that my apprenticeship had been only the
beginning of a very long road. And the
strenuous experiences I had undergone,
which were so overwhelming to me, were
but a small fragment of a system of bgical
thoughtjromwhichDonJuandrewmeaningful inferences for his day-to-day Ife, a
vastly complex system of beliefs in which
injury was an experience leading to exul
tation.'
How exhilarating it would be to have a profes
sor who not only thoroughly analyzes questions
and discussed the law, but one who trulyenjoyed
"guiding" students through the many quagmires
encountered while seeking legal knowledge....
Perhaps we have such a person, such a "guide."
Such a "guide" would have us journey through,
and then beyond the texts, hornbooks, restate
ments, and treatises, all of which are known

virtually verbatim by the "guide." He would be
able tosummarize a questionable statute or court
decision by simply noting that, there is a point
beyond which even justice becomes unjust.2...
Perhaps we have such a person, such a guide.
Visitors to our university, strolling in our hall
ways might happen to overhear dialogue or
interchange between student and such a person,
such a "guide." The visitors might look quizzi
cally towards the classroom, and momentarily
pause to reassure themselves that they are in the
right building- forthey might havejust heard the
"guide" saying ina whisper, to a hushedaudience
of students straining to hear his every word, after
not having been able to answer, to his own
satisfaction, a query pertaining to a precept of
law:
Fbwer in the crannied wall,
I p luck you out of the crannies;I hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower - but fI could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all,
I should know what God and man is.3
The "guide" would explain that no one knows
everything about any one thing and when man
ascertains all knowledge about any one thing,
then man has become one with his or her
God..Perhaps we have such a person, such a
"guide." Another visitor, at another time, may
have heard the "guide," after asking for volun
teers to "assist" him in attempting to unlock the
mysteries of a particularly difficult, seemingly
unfathomable statute, and getting no response
simply say, A man should never be shamed to
own he has been in the wrong, which is but say,
inotherwords, that he is wiser today than he was
yesterdaf... Perhapswe havesuchaperson, such
a "guide."
If we did have such a person, sucha "guide".
He would have been considered by many to have
been the Promethean spark, the keystone for
North Carolina Central University School of
Law with his vigorous defense, in 1965, against
Governor Moore's proposal to close the law
school. His research would have led the "Papa-"
which assistedin the defeat of Governor Moore's
desire to close the law school because the school
was supposedly not cost effective. One would
onlyobtainbutaglimmerofthis "guide's" mindset,
by reviewing but a portion of his 1965 prophetic
statement:
More and more law schools are limiting
their enrollmenttothetopfiveortenpercent
ofcollegegradua&ngclasses. Consequently,
the student graduating in the bwer, upper,
or middle part of his classfrom any college
is finding his source of obtaining a legal
education diminishing. Because of this
3

factor, North Carolina College Law School
is in a unique position of performing an
invaluable service to worthy and deserving
students as well as contributing to the gen
eral welfare of the State.
Dean Emeritus Daniel Sampson has beenour
guide. He obtained his B.S. and M.A . degrees
before serving in theArmy during World WarII.
He thenobtained hisLL.B.andLLM. atBoston
College and joined thefaculty in 1950,at what is
now known asNorth CarolinaCentral University
School of L aw; and he has been with us ever
since. He would become the Dean of this Law
School from1965 to1969 and belargely respon
sible for admitting native American and white
students, thereby integrating the studen t b ody.
He was instrumental ingetting the degree classi
fication, bestowed upon law school graduates,
changed from LL.B. to aLD.5. In 1969, he was
asked toserve as theLegal Advisor to theUniver
sity President and alsoserved on numerouscom
mittees and became Chairman of theLaw Dean
Search Committee in 1980.
This man, this "guide" is not one torest on his
many laurels. Since retiring in 1984, he has been
an adjunct professor and the "guide" for Ad
vanced Torts and Debtor/Creditor law. He wasa
member of the1985 Law DeanSearch Commit
tee.6
Our "guide" is a man who was described in
1971 as a person who never had students wh o
were uncomfortable in his presence and, his
understanding of students' problems forges a
strong link which is inseverable!
Nothing has changed. Our "guide"continues to
agonize whenever a student has a poor perfor
mance, thinking that he somehow failed in his
responsibilities as "guide,"rather than placing the
blame upon the student for not being prepared.
Our "guide" will not allow a student the false
luxury of suggesting any outcome,in the law, is
certain. He would be inclined to say, Certainly
generally is illusbn, and repose is not the destiny
of man!1
Try not to pass up die "journey," the inquiry,
the experience, which could lead to exhilaration,
with this wise and uniquely qualified "guide."
You will sense his wisdom, you will feel it and
turn your mind towardsit, just as you would turn
yourfacetowardsanearlysummersun. You will
enjoy the self-deprivating h umor and come to
"know" the clarity and the wisdom which ema
nates from this "guide." The most manifest sign
of wisdom is a continued cheerfulness-, her
state is like that of things in the regions, above
the moon, always clear and serene.9 Bask in
this "guide's good humor and serenity.
Tennyson said, Knowledge comes but wisdom
lingers!" The hope is that this wise "guide"

(Continued on page 4)

Journey With A "Guide"
(Continued from page 3)

lingers with us for many a year, and "guides"
many a student through some of the seemingly
overwhelming, complex legal disciplines, allow
ing them to see how the strenuous mental expe
riences of trying to understand cases, reveling in
the poetic beauty of the writings of Cardoza,
I find, etal, will buildasystemoflogicalthoughts.
Then perhaps, more of us would be in a
position to say, thou wert my guide, phibsopher,
and friendP

By: A grateful traveler: WJO
ENDNOTES
Carlos Castanet!;!, The teachings of Don Juan:
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Tribute To Greatness:
Thurgood Marshall
(continued from page 1)
The October 1992 issue of the Fordham Law
Review presented Fordham Law School's tribute
to one of thegiants of American Law and Ameri
can history on the occasion of his retirement from
the Supreme Court William MTreanor, Associ
ate Professor of Law at Fordham Law School
noted:
Justice Thurgood Marshall is, I believe,
the single most important lawyer of this
century, both for his contribution as an
advocate and for his contributbn as a jurist
...The United States today is a remarkably
different place than it was in 1933 when he
began practice, and ours is far more just
society.
Justbe Thurgood Marshall made history

repeatedly - as Chief Counsel oftheNAACP
LegalDefense Fund,as Judge cfthe United
States Supreme Court cf Appears for the
Second Circuit, as Solicitor General, and,
of course, as Supreme Court Justice. But
perhaps his most important contributbn
was his victory in the case of Brown v. Board
of Education?
Brown was the capstone of Justice Marshall's
campaign at the NAACP Legal Defense Fund to
combat a nd eradicate stale-sponsored segregatioa There were, of course, two Supreme Court
decision in Brown. In the first decision, in 1954,
Chief Justice Warren, on behalf of a unanimous
Court, rules that "(separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal." 5 The following year, in
Brown II, the Court rejected Marshall's request to
fix a date for the end to segregation,6 it unani
mously directed the district courts to admit (the
parties) to public schools on a racially nondis
criminatory basis with all del iberate speed."7
Together, the decision in Brown were, at the
same lime, both revolutionary and conservative.
They were revolutionary because they dramati
cally changed the law and thelife of the people in
this country; yet, they were conservative because
that change was effected by the actions of lawfully
constituted authority.
Perhaps the most famous critique of the juris
prudence of
is Professor HerbCTt Wechsler's
1959 essay Toward Neutral Principles of Law, in
which he contended that the decision was unprin
cipled and contrary to basic tenets of constitutional
govemmenL8 More recently, Professor Charles
Lawrence and others have said that the Court in
Brownlmissed the real wrong. Byfocusingonthe
psychological har ms of segregation, th e Court
missed the fact that the real harm of segregation is
lhalisstigmalizesand subordinates African-Ameri
cans. It has additionally been argued that because
the court got the "right' wrong in Brown I, the
Supreme Court in the 1970s and 1980s was able
to retreat from its commitment to civil rights.
Just as the right has been attacked, so has the
remedy. The limited remedy of Brown II - and in
particular the "all deliberate speed" formulation did not promptly vindicate the rights of AfricanAmericans. In fact, ten years a fter Brown, only
two percent of B lack children in the South at
tended desegregated schools.10
These two themes, the transformation that
Brown created and the limits of that transforma
tion, are the focus of the first potion of thetribute,
"Brown and the Transformation of the Constitu
tion."
The first contribution was from one of the
legends of the civil rights movement, Judge
Constance Baker Motley. Judge Motley partici
pate din all of the major education cases during her
4

two decades with theLegal DefenseFund, includ
ing both Brown and Brown II, in which she was
one of the attorneys who wrote the briefs that the
Legal Defense Fund submitted to the Supreme
Court. Judge Motley places Brownin the context
of the earliest civil r ights cases that eroded the
force olPlessy v.Ferguson,11and assess the impact
of the Brown decision. The second speaker,
Professor Mark Tushnet, speaking from the van
tage point of historian and legal scholar, probed
the gap between Brown I's right and Brown II's
remedy, and concluded that the "al l deliberate
speed" formulation ultimately,andironically, con
tributed to the rise of judicial activism and modem
public law litigation. Then Judge Louis Pollak
spoke. He is a long-time adviser to theNAACP
Legal Defense Fund, one of the attorneys who
wrote the brief in Brown II, and author of the
article, Racial Discriminatbn and Judicial Integ
rity. A Reply to ProfessorWechsler}1 Although
then-Professor Pollak disagreed with the Court's
reasoning, that article provided one of the most
important defen ses of the constitutional legiti
macy of the holding in Brown. Judge Pollak
discussed the generative power of Brown's com
mitment to the principle of equality, a power that
he sees manifested in the Supreme Court's juris
prudence of the next quarter-century.
The second portion of "Civil Rights in Educa
tion after Brown," focused on a specific aspect of
Brown's legacy: the on-going campaign to end
school segregation. Four attorneys who played an
important and distinguished role in litigating postBrawn civil rights cases will focus on one or two
of the education cases on which ht ey worked and
the lessons that can be drawn from those experi
ences.
The casesare for the most part, a second genera
tion of segregation cases -second generation not
merely in terms of chronology, but also sec ond
generation in teams of the typeof case. The focus
is no longer primarily, as it was in the years
immediately following Brown, on the South, al
though it remains in the South as well. These are
cases in which educational
segregation is inextricably linked to segregation in
housing, and in which segregation in housing is a
product of White flight as much as itis a product
of segregation within the town or the city.
The problems posed by these cases are more
complex, but the underlyingissues remain largely
thesameaslhey wereinBram Whatisthenature
of theconstitutionalrights involved" Whatkindof
remedyisappropriateforthose rights? Whatisthe
relationshipbetweentherightsarticulatedby courts
and the remedies that they require to be followed?
What is the relation between judicial enunciation
of rights and remedies and popular support for
civil rights? To these questions, however, a new
oneisadded: Doesthemorecomplexnatureofthe

(Continued on page 5)

Tribute To Greatness: Thurgood Marshall
(Continued from page 4)
segregation involved necessitate a different
kind of remedy?
Mr. Conrad Harper, a member of the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund's staff from 1965 to 1970, discussed
Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School
District," a casewhichplayedanimportant
role in the eventually successful challenge
lo Monroe v. Pope's^baxia civil rights suits
against municipalities. Mr. Harper argued
that the case illustrates how the Legal De
fense Fund successfully combated hos tile
precedent. Professor Drew Days, aformer
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights
and FirstAssistant Counsel for theNAACP
Legal Defense Fund, offered the
Ffillsborough County, R orida school de
segregation case15 as an example of how
integration can besuccessfully achieved. In
a dramatically different tone, Judge
Nathaniel Jones, NAACPGeneral Counsel
for a decade, discussed Milliken v. Bradley16
Milliken was the critical case in the attempt to
apply theprinciples enunciated in Brown to Northem schools, and,Judge Jones eloquently declares,
the Supreme Court's decision in Milliken I was a
"watershed" event in the retreat from the Court's
commitment to racial equality. The final speaker
was Professor Theodore Shaw. Professor Shaw
was a trial attorney in the Civil RightsDivision of
the Department of Justice, Assistant Counsel and
Directorof theEducalionDocketfortheNAACFs
Legal DefenseFund,andWesternRegional Coun
sel for the Legal Defease Fund. He discussed
Missouri v. Jenkins17 and Dowell v. Board of
Education.18 Professor Shaw used these casesas
evidence of thecomplexity of the schooldesegre
gation issue,of thedifficulties that those who hope
to cany onin thetradition of Justice Marshallmust
confront, and ofthe importance of carryingon that
traditioa
The closing remarks came from the program's
moderator, Mr. Paul Dimond, a distinguished
scholar and former Director of the National
Lawyer's Committee forCivil Rights under Law.
Mr. Dimond suggested that an "anti-caste" prin
ciple informs the Supreme Court's decision in
Brown and arguesfor its revival. Returning tothe
theme of the difference between the right and the
remedy in Brown, Mr. Dimond defended the
appropriateness of separating right and remedy.
He arguedthat thecombination of the enunciation
of broad constitutional principles and th e use of
constrained judicial remedies acknowledges limi
tations on judicial power while permitting coali
tion bui lding

Taken all together, the speakers, illust rate the
many dimensions of Brown's legacy. Th e panel
ists' comments demonstrate that the promise of
Brown remains and may well long remain unful
filled. But the weightof their remarks is to mark
and celebrate a triumph. Thecomments show the
way in which the decision's support for the prin
ciple of racial equality empowered the civil rights
movement and shaped subsequent constitutional
and legal developments on a host of fronts, and
they show how Brown set an aspirational standard
against which subsequent developments wou ld
be tested.
The remarks of the speakers also underscored
the incomparable significance of the career of
Justice Thurgood Marshall. The speakers dis 
cussed Justice Marshall in many different con
texts. They spoke of him as a colleague, as a
Supreme Court Justice, as a hero. Regardless of
how they know him, the common thread is that he
touched their lives. Although in different ways,
eachofthespeakershasbeenafighterforthecause
of racial justice and equality. In that struggle, each
of the panelists was clearly inspired and chal
lenged by Thurgood Marshall. It is this ability to
challenge and inspire countless mm and women
-just as muchas itis his role in personally shaping
the l aw - that constitutes Thurgood Marshall's
legacy.

Closing Remarks: Paul Dimond
As I was intimately involved in trying all aspects
of Milliken, I would like to begin by sharing my
seasoned observatio ns about that case. First, in
considering the meaning of Milliken,it seems to me
thalthcpublicmcssagcof AfrMen/andMillikenll,

in combination, is that racial segregation in
metropolitan Americaisinnocentonccyour
get beyond the inner-city boundary: it's no
one'sfaultandit'snoone'sresponsibility. At
the same time, the Burger Court bent over
backwards to permit an order against a stale
authority to infuse funds into an inner-city
school district proven guilty of de jure
segregation. In its own way, Milliken can
best be understood as a "separate but equal"
result for our times.
Second I wantyou to think with me about
the choices made in the proces s of this
major constitutional litigatioa In Milliken,
we had fifty-seven trial days to make our
|
case in the trial court At the start of the trail,
s»
District Judge Stephen Roth, an immigrant
from Hungary said, "I made it and I don't
understand why Blackscannot" Heinvited
us out of his courtroom, literally, twice in
preliminary motions. Yet like the justice of
the peace that he was, JudgeRoth agreed to sit there
and hear all the evidence. By the end of that fiftyseven days, he was convinced that the State of
Michigan was an integral partofa system of racial
ghettoization in which there was an expanding core
of Black families in Black neighborhoods always
confined within a line separate and distinct from a
receding ring of White schools and White neigh
borhoods.
When it got near the end of the trial, in what has
been describe d as thinking about remed y while
hearing the evidence of violation, I recall Judge
Roth said, "My God, if fin going to limitremedy to
the boundary of the school dis trict of the City of
Detroit, Til merely be imposing - and giving my
imprimatur to - the latest line of contain ment of
segregation."
As it came about, when thecase hit the Supreme
Court, the remedy that Judge Ro th then con tem
plated, which involved some fifty-four school dis
tricts, had been vacated by the court of appeals on
procedural grounds. As a result, the only issue
before the Supreme Court was whether or not Judge
Roth'sconceptionofviolation was accurate, whetha
or not even one single Black child would be able to
cross that latest line of racial containment.
Courts make choices when they hear cases. In
Milliken I,the majority chose to ignore their oppor
tunity. Instead, the Burger Court's majority opinion
proceeds with a recitation of how the district judge
was a radical who unilaterally reached out to rope
in all of the suburbs through massive cross-district
busing, because he did not happen to like the racial
composition of majority-Black schools. The ma
jority opinion has n o conception of the Court's
(Continued on page 6)

ask whether we can change the terms of the debate
about discriminati on as it may still exist in the
(Continued from page 5)
country.
opportunity to issue a Brown 1 violation ruling for
I do not want to suggest a grand political, or even
our time by deferring the consideration of remedy litigation, strategy in order to give greate r public
for another day. The opportunity wets before the meaning today to Justice Marshall's great victory in
Burger Court to find a violation which would have Brown. Allow me, instead to suggest a narrower
required n o remedy at that point in time, which principle. It has three elements:
could have permitted a remand for exactly the type
First, the legal basis for the claim of discrimina
of transformative political, judicial, and social result tion must be broad enough to include all racial,
that followed from Brown II. /nstead, because the ethnic, and gender groups.
Court was so concerned about, let's say, the political
We can see the future of the country in the three
ramifications of what it was doing - andI will add, fastest growing states - Florida, Texas, and Califor
at least in part because it was so focused on remedial nia. By the year 2000, the majority of the children
considerations - it never even thought about grasp in those states are going to be minorities, and the
ing this opportunity.
largest minority in each of those states is going to be
Fatally, let me share one final irony in Milliken. Hispanic, not African-American.
Timing, as some say, is everything. Justice Harry
Second, the legal basis for the claim of discrimi
Blackmun was the swing vote in the 54 majorityin nation must bedeep enough to admit all manner of
Milliken II. Three years later, four years later, and proof of wrongd oing. It is essential that there be
five years later, he was the seeing vote that provided room for evidence of adominant majority, singling
the victories for the plaintiffs, not only in the central out and marking by caste, a particular minority
school district cases from Dayton and Columbus, group for abuse, neglect, or disregard, whether in
but also a statewide, cross-district, metropolitan single acts - nomatter how isolated - or incomplex
case from Wilmington, Delaware.
patterns - no matter how interwoven. A no-fault
Think about Supreme Court Justices. Theirs is theory of discrimination has no moral claim on the
not the single case that tests whatever their ideology conscience of any court or on the country.
or judicial philosophy may be against the weight of
Third, the basis for thediscrimination claim must
evidence; rather, it is the series of cases that come be restrained enough to recognize that the first
before the Justices over a course of years. I ask the obligation is to plumb the full extent and depth of
question, then, if AMife/thadonly come three years any such caste wrong, not to evaluate the extent and
later, where would the law and the national con limits for the courts' remedial powers, (emphasis
science of the country be today with respect to the added)
issues of racial discrimination?
We should concede that the more massive and
I would like to turn, from such speculation about entrenched the wrong of discrimination, the more
the past, in order to think about the future of judicial important it is for thecourts to declare the lull extent
review in race cases. Think, fw a moment, about the of that wrong. The courts must also permit th e
possibilities for change if we focus more of our ultimate remedy t o be worked out in a political
energy, more of our evidence, more of our political process in which those who are grieved will at least
debate, and more of our legal argument on the actual have a continuing claim that the declared wrong
violation. Consider the possibilities ifwe infuseour cannot be remedied in the courts alone.
proof of violation with a greater reach and worry
By now, we should all be mature enough to
less about the extent of court-ordered remedy. understand the limits of courts in exercising their
Could this provide a way to continue the debate, as counter majoritarian powers and their function of
Ted Shaw called it, in order to assure a more open judicial review. I suggest that we ought to think
judicial process?
about doing so with respect to remedy- much as the
Do not despair about the potential fw such trans Warren Court did in Brown II.
formation simply because of the narrowing of the
This restrained approach to court-ordered rem
Burger and Rehnquist Courts. After all, in atribute edies in cases of entrenched discriminati on will
to Justice Marshall, I think it is appropriate to note have one additional benefit It will encourage the
that our situation today is far less bleak than was his. building of political coalitions and affirmative rem
Today, there are no laws at the books that exclude edies that are sufficiently inclus ive a s to make
anybody by race If om jobs, from public accommo irrelevant remedial classification along the lines of
dations, from public facilities, from public schools, the original discriminatioa
from conveyances, from owning property. There
With respect to remedy, I also think we need to
are no signs on drinking fountains or bathrooms recognize that in a free society empowering real
saying "Whites only."...
personal choices fw individuals is not necessarily
So, rather than ftjrther bemoaning the narrowing inconsistent with remedying even the most en
of civil rights under the Rehnquist and Burger
trenched discrimination against minority groups.
Courts, I ask you to look forward with me. Let us
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In sum, I ask that you consider whethe r we
should seek a rebirth of what I havedubbed else
where the "anli'caste'principle." I believe this prin
ciple undergirds the Fourteenth Amendment as
originally interpreted in Strauder v. West Virginia
and explains and informsBrown. Thealternative it
seems to me is tocontinue with a suspect classifica
tion analysis, some kind of modified tow-tier ap
proach, i n which the only judicially cognizable
claims of wrongdoing will b e those rare aberrant
acts today when somebody makes a mistake and
speaks explicitly of race. In fact, the primary cases
that will be challenged under this wooden approach
to judicial review of racial discrim ination will be
those in which the majority, for whatever reason,
decides that it wishes to try to provide affirmative
relief to minorities.
What is the risk of trying the anti-case principle?
Isn't the risk the same as it was in1896 at the time
of the Plessy v. Ferguson decision? Couldn't the
Rehnquist Court say "There is no longer any caste
discrimination in America based on today's facts?
Yet, let us consider what is different about today
from 1896. We have the right of free speech
guaranteed, and we have the right for all to vote
guaranteed If such an awful judgment emerged
from the Rehnquist Court, we would at least have
the opportunity to continuethe debate in the politi
cal arena on terms that involve fundamental right
and wrong.
I would like to leave you with this last thought
I submit that the anti-caste principle can empower
us to debate, both in the Court and across the
country, in this decade and into the next century,
whether the second Reconstruction should con
tinue. Keeping this dialogue with conscience open
is a far worthier legacy of Brown and Justice
Marshall than allowing a conservative Rehnquist
Court to slowly but surely shut thedoorof the Court,
and with itthe conscience of the country, to virtually
all claims of wrongful discriminatioa**
**SeveralmonthsafterthetributetoJusticeMarshall,
the Supreme Court issued its ruling in the higher
education case arising in Mississippi, UnitedStates
v. Fordice, 112 SCl 2727 (1992). Although one
ruling in a particular case is not dispositive, I am
encouraged that a clear majority on the Rehnquist
Court found a continuing violation in the dual
system of higher education and remanded without
specific instructions as to remedy so that the parties
- within the political process - would confront the
unremedied wrong. That this case arose in the
context of volunta ry choices in higher education
(rather than the conditions of mandato ry assign
ments in elementary an d secondary schoo ling),
may well have the Court to examine the extent of
the wrong and toaccept the limits for court-ordered
remedies more fully. See generally Anti-Caste
(Continued on page 7)
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Principle, supra note 7, at45-50.
It would appear that Justice Tluirgood Marshall
lives on not only in our hearts, but also lives on in
The Court.

Edited by WJ.O.
The Barrister would like to thank the Fordham

Law Review for authorization to p ublish the
edited version ohheSymposium,Brown v.Board
ofEducation audits Legacy: A Tributetojustice
ThurgoodMarshall; and Fordham Law Profes

sor William M. Treanor.
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CHILDREN'S ISSUES:
TERMINATION OF PARENTALRIGHTS AND
ABUSE AND NEGLECT
The Pare ntal Right to Atte nd He arings was re cently
decided vi a In re Q uevedo, 419 S£2d 158 (N.C. Cl App.
1992). TrialcowtsrefwaltoproYideforthetransportalion
of an inca rcerated father to his term ination of parental
rights he aring did not violate the father's due process rights.
A petition w as filed i n N orth C arolina t o t erminate the
parental rights of a father who was incarcerated in Massachu
setts. Prior to tr ial, t he f ather's c ourt-appointed la wyer
motioned to have the Mia transported from prison to attend
the hearing or to postpone the hearing until the fattier could
attend. Hi e trial court denied this motion. T he attorney then
movedfor ftmds to transport the fattier from prison in order to
take his deposition T his motion was also dotted. H owever,
the father was permitted to submit affidavits at the hearing.
The hearing was held without the father present (his attorney
attended). His p arental rights were terminated and he ap
pealed, claiming his due process rights had been violated.
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina affirmed, finding no
due process violation The court recognized a parent's due
process right to be present at a termination of parental rights
proceeding was not absolute. Todelerminewhefliertheiather
was entitled to be transported to the hearing, the court referred
to the factors set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US. 319 (1976): (1) the private
interests affected, (2) the risk of error created by the procedure,
and (3) the government's interest in using the procedure
The court found the father's interest in his child would be
affected by t he proceeding, and recognized that interest as
extremely impoitanL I t also found the state's interests in the
child's welfare, reducing costs, and the security of prisoners
were significant, and out-weighed the father's interest Fi
nally, it d etermined the risk of e rror in c onducting th e
termination h earing w ithout th e father p resent w as s light
Although the lather was not able to present evidence in person
and help his attorney with cross-examination, he was allowed
to sutmit an affidavit This affidavit explained wiiy he had not
seen his daughters and described his attempts to contact them.
In light of this affidavit and his attorney's ability to conduct
cross-examination, th e c ourt c oncluded th e re sult o f th e
hearing would not have been different if the father had been
present Thus, his due process rights had not been violated.
Tic court made a final observation that the father's rights
would have been better protected if he had been transported
to North Carolina and deposed. According to the court, "when
an incarcerated parent is denied tran^ortation to the hearing
in contested termination ca ses, the better practice is for the
court, when so moved, to provide the funds necessary for the
deposing of the incarcerated parent"

Abuse, Neglect and Hearsay
The issue of die R eliability of C hildren's Hearsay was
discussed in State v. Ed wards, 485 N.W2d 911 (Min n.

1992). Child's hear say sta tement shou ld not hav e been
excluded unde r the catc h-all exception based on di e trial
courfs finding that the ch ild w as incompetent to testify at
trial
Defendant was charged with sexually abusing his wife's
seven-year-old granddaughter. A rt a pretrial hearing, the trial
court determined the child was not competent to testily at trial.
On this basis, the trial court denied the state's motion to admit
certain out-of-court statements made by the child. Th ecourt
of appeals ultimately affirmed the trial court's decision that the
child's s tatements w ere n ot a dmissible under t he e xcited
utterance and "catch-all" exceptions.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed. Th ree out-ofcourt statements by the child WOT at issue: on e made to the
911 o perator im mediately f ollowing th e in cident, a nother
made to a police officer who responded to the call minutes
alter the incident, and a third matte to a different officer at the
hospital approximately one hour after the incident At the
outset th e court h eld th at th e first tw o s tatements w ere
admissible under the excited utterance exception
The court then turned to the child's third hearsay statement
made to the officer at the hospital. Th e court assumed this
statement did not qualify' as an excited utterance, but found it
was admissible under the catch-all exception. The United
States S upreme Court in I daho v . W right 49 7 U .S. 8 05
(1990), required that to satisfy the confrontation clause, an
out-of-court statement may not be admitted under the catch
all (o r re sidual) ex ception u nless it po ssess "p articular
guarantees of t rustworthiness." Th ese guarantees must be
determined from the totality of the circumstances surrounding
the making of the statement Looking at these circumstances,
the court noted the child appeared to be frightened when she
made the statement and had no apparent motive to lie. Th e
statement itself was not the type a child would be expected to
fabricate. In addition, the officer did not have a preconceived
idea of wh at th e c hild w ould say. Finally, th e c hild's
statements were internally consistent during the interview and
had "an immediately apparent 'ring of credibility.'"
An out-of-court statement should not be considered per se
unreliable if madeby in incompetent witness. The courtfound
the child's incompetency reflected on her ability to testily in
court rather than on her ability to perceive the incident and
accurately relate iL S ince the circumstances sunounding the
child's making of the statement indicated the statement was
reliable, the statement should have been admitted under the
catch-all e xception
Edited by WJ.O.
The Barrister would like to thank The ABA Juvenile
and Child Law Reporter for the permission to print
these edited versions of the articles which were pub
lished in the January 1993 edition.
(Continued on page 8)

Light On The Rape HALLway:
North Carolina Sheds Some Light on the Admissibility of Evidence of
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
Over the past several years our courts have
become more sensitive to the long-term effects
suffered by victims of rape. These effects are
known as post-traumatic stress disorder or
PTSD.l Symptoms ofPTSD include feelings
of anxiety, frustration, depression, hyper-vigi
lance, hyper-awareness, alarm, and endangerment; - rape victims can also experience a
general fear of men. In addition, an accompa
nying conversion reaction mayresult wherethe
victim suffers from a neurologicall y inexpli
cable paralysis caused by the psychological
trauma of the rape.
While the effects ofPTSD andconversion are
well documented. American courts have
struggled in determining when this evidence
may be admitted in a criminal trial TheNorth
Carolina Supreme Court recently decided this
issue in State v. Hall} hi Hall the court limited
the use ofPTSDand conversion evidence. This
[edited] article will discuss toe soundness of
such limitations and toe practical difficulties
that juries will undoubtedly face in trying to
follow a judge's instruction as to toe limited
admissibility of evidence ofPTSD andconver
sion.
In February of 1988, Donney Ray Hall was
indicted for second degree rape and second
degree sexual activity byasubstituteparenL At
trial the fifteen-year old stepdaughter of toe
defendant referred to a s MM, testified that
after midnight onFcbruary 14,1988, toe defen
dant entered her room and had intercourse with
her. TheStale offered no physical evidence that
a rape had occurred. Th e state did present
evidence that MM. had suffered PTS D and
conversion by way of the testimony of three
health care professionals, two doctors and a
clinical social worker, who had cared for M.M.
in the months after the alleged rape. The basis
of their collective testimony was that MM "fa
the 'profile'of sexually abusedchildren,that she
suffered a neurologically inexplicable paraly
sis known as 'conversion reaction,' which is
caused by severe psychobgical trauma, anxi
ety, or depressbn; and that she was suffering
from post-traumatic stress disorder, which in
volves psychobgical responses to certain emo
tionally traumatic events"*
The defendant objected to the testimony by
the health care professionals, but all objections
were denied. The trial court admitted toe

testimonies, but did not give any limiting in
structions to the jury as to the use of toe PTSD
and conversion evidence. As such, toe jury
found the defendant guilty of sec ond degree
rape and sexual activity by a substitute parenL
The defendant thai appealed to the North Caro
lina Court of Appeals.
The appealscourt upheld the convictioa On
toe issue of the admissibility of toe PTSD
conversion evidence, the court held that toe
evidence was admissible because the testimony
would help toe jury determine if MM. had been
raped. In addition, the court held that toe
evidence of PTSD and conversion would help
toe jury understand the behavior of sexually
abused children and aid in assessing toe crcdibilityofthe victim asawitness.5 Thedefendant
appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court
On discretionary review, the North Carolina
Supreme Court, in a four to three decision,
overturnedthe convictioa Sincethiswasacase
of first impression for the supreme court, toe
court relied on case law from outside jurisdic
tions, specifically California and New York, in
determining toe admissibility of PTSD and
conversion evidence. In toe opinion written by
ChiefJusticeExum, toecourt held that evidence
of PTSD and conversion was properly admis
sible if relevant but the evidence could not be
admitted for the purpose of proving that the rape
actually occurred.6
The court cited two reasons for limiting toe
admissibility of PTSD and conversion evi
dence: "first, psychiatric procedures in devel
oping the diagnosis are designed for therapeu
tic purposes and are not reliable as fact finding
tools to determine whether a rape has in fact
occurred"7 "..second, the potential for preju
dice boms large because the jury may accord
too much weight to expert opinions stating
medical conclusions which were drawn from
diagnostic methods having limitedmeritasfact
finding devices."'
The court was concerned that a number of
different traumatic events, in addition to rape,
could createsymptoms ofPTSD orconversion.
Thecourtdidexplain, however, thatevidenceof
PTSD and conversion could be admitted for
corroborative purposes such as explaining the
complainanfspost-assault behavior or aiding in
toe complainants credibility as a witness. The
court explained that the purpose f a which
8

PTSD and conversion evidence is offered will
determine toe evidence's admissibility.
The court held that because the state presented
no physical evidence of rape or sexual abuse, the
trial judge erred in failing to give a limiting
instruction to the jury on toe admissibility of the
PTSD andconversion evidence. The court held
that toe defendant had shown, as required by
North Carolina General Statutes, that there was
areasonableprrobabilily that the defendantwould
have been acquitted absent the PTSD and con
version evidence. Therefore, toecourtremandcd
toe case for retrial
Justice Wichard dissented on the ground that
toe majority's decision concerned the "weightor
credibility of toe evidence, andnot its admissibil
ity." Justice's We bb and Mitchell joined in the
dissent9
PRIOR LAW AND PRACTICE

The North Carolina Supreme Court had sev
eral opportunities, prior to Hall to rule on the
admissibility ofPTSD evidence.One of toe first
instances was in State v. Clemmonsf In
Clemmons, toe court refused to overturn toe
defendant's conviction of rape. Despiteconced
ing that toe trial court madean improper ruling in
admittingevidenceofthedefcndant'spriorsexual
misconduct towards a female, toe court held that
there was overwhelming evidence against the
defendant Particularly, toe court stressed the
evidence of "severe(PTSD) for a lengthy period
immediately following theincident"11 Thisdicta
indicated toe court's willingness to allow PTSD
evidence in a rape trial through toe court did not
specifically rule on PTSD evidence.
In State v. Stafford, a rape tr ial a doctor
testified about thesymptoms ofPTSD present in
toe victim. The court held that toe doctor's
testimony regarding PTSD was hearsay and not
within the North Carolina Rule 803 (4) excep
tion. Thecourtheldthattoestaiementsmade,by
the victim, to the doctor were in preparation for
trial and were not made for medical purposes.
Thecourtstated, however,"Weneitherreach nor
decide the question of whether in a proper case
expert testimon y concerning (PTSD) will be
admitted in the trial courts of this state."13
In Godwin,14 a sexual offense andattempted
rape case, toe court found that toe state had not
properly laid the foundation to qualify the clini
cal social worker witnessas an expertonPTSD.
(Continued on page 9)

Light On The Rape HALLway:
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Hie court found that the admission of the wit
ness'testimony was improperand ordered anew
trial; bu t the court refused to decide whether
PTSD evidence wasadmissible in North Caro
lina.
Evidence of PTSD, has been considered in a
number of other jurisdictions. In People v. Tay
lor 15, New Yak's highest court, after it under
took an exhaustive review of almost every
jurisdiction that has ruled o n PTSD evidence,
held that whether PTSD evidencewill beadmis
sible depends on the purpose for which itis being
offered. In Taylor the court noted that many
jurisdictions allow the introduction of PTSD
into evidence, but that there was "no uniform
approach to the admission of evidence of
(PTSD)..."16
The Taybr court also notedthat, in California,
evidence of PTSDwas not admissible toprove
that the rapeactually occurred. However, Cali
fornia, along with Kansas, WestVirginia, Mary
land, Arizona, M ontana, and Iowa, have allowedPTSDevidencewhere the Issue is whether
or not sex was consensual. Colorado, Indiana,
Oregon, Hawaii, New Hampshire, Delaware,
Connecticut, and Vermont, have also admitted
PTSD evidenceas adefense, "toexplain behav
ior exhibited by the complainant that might be
viewed as inconsistent with a claim of rape. 17
Only Missouri, Washington, andPennsylvania,
have specifically refused to allow expert testi
mony of PTSD.
ANALYSIS

Courts will always attempt toprotect theJudicial
process and insure that defendants have a fair
trial - furthermore, judges must defer to the
expertise of medical personnel in determining
the validity of new diagnoses. The NorthCaro
lina Supreme Court waited six years to makea
specific ruling on the admissibility of PTSDand
conversion of evidence - from State v.
Clemmons,18 in 1986, to Ha ll in 1992 While
properly considering precedent in other jurisdic
tions and the recognition of PTSD as a diag
nosed disorder, the North Carolina supreme
arurt hasmadeanecessary and cautious attempt
to deal with oneof the latest medical diagnoses.
In Hall, the court recognized "t he inherent
prejudicial dangers of a per se admissibility of
PTSD testimony." By emphasizing the purely
therapeutic role of physicians and social work
ers, the court distinguished why thetestimony of
PTSD and conversioncan not be accepted asa
true fact-finding tool Furthermore, by rccog(Continued on page 13)

UPDATE: THE ABC'S OF THE ABA:
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
- WHY A REQUIRED COURSE?
I the previous edition ofThe Barrister it was
reported that it appeared North Carolina Cen
tral university's Schoolof Law has,and contin
ues to, require all third year students to take
Statutory Interpretation in direct violation of
the American Bar Association's...Council of
the Section of the Section of Legal Education
and the Accreditation Committee Standards
301 and 302
In summary, Standards 301 and 302 denote
that a law school may offer a course fa1 im
proving student performance for barexamina
tions. However, law schools may NOT offer
such a course for academic credit OR AS A
CONDmONTO GRADUATION. Thecase
was made that the course called Statutory
Interpretation was at best, a mini review of
those courses testedon the North Carolina bar
exam which were NOT required courses.
It was suggested that the administration and
the SB A lode into the matterbefore the ABA
brought the matter to the attention of the law
school.
Since the publication of that article the fol
lowing has transpired:
• The SBA contacted the administration
of the law school and was told that
because the matter was not addressed
before publication it would not be dis
cussed with The Barrister staff. More
over, the administrator indicated tiwould
not discuss a- put the matter on the
agenda of any faculty meeting. This of
course suggests that the administration
is content to deal with form rather than
substance.
• Apparently the faculty did have the
common sense and decency to discuss
the matter at a faculty meeting. How
ever, the administrations's position
showed the usual inflexibility. The
administration again refused to "look
into" thematter and basically said-if an
when theABA comeshere and tellsus to
change - then well change. Unfortu
nately for allstudents, theadministration
opts, once again, to"circle the wagons."
• Now for the good news. Student &
facility response to the article was quite
favor able. Moreover, it was then
suggested that because of the
administration's 'nonresponse,' that a

petition be drafted and submitted to the
ABA Accreditation Committee asking
for an investigation of the matter. The
petition was drafted, last semester, dur
ing the last day of class but we obtained
a sufficient number of 'signatures' even
though the majority of students did not
get to see or sign the petitioa
• The petition was sent to the ABA and
a recent telephone call determined that
the petition was inadvertently placed in
afilewithoutanyfurtherfollow-up. The
ABA attorney indicated that the matter
would be addressed post-haste and that
The Barrister would be given a status
report in the near future.
• If the ABA determines thatthe petition
constitutes validfacts, withregard to the
Standards, the ABA will then send a
copy of the petition to the Dean of the
Law School and request that the Dean
respond to the allegations in the petition
and to provide any additional informationrequiredby the ABA. Further, upon
receipt of the response ofthe Deanof the
Law School, the ABA will either
a) Dismiss thecomplaintif the ABA
determines that the petition and the
Dean'sresponse considered together
donotsupport aclaim thatthe school
is in non-compliance with the Stan
dards.
b) Place the petition on the agenda
for the next site evaluation of the
Law School if the ABA determines
that the complaint and the Dean's
response considered together indi
cate conditions or practicesthat raise
a question concerning the school's
compliance with the Standards.
• The Barrister will also attempt to
have an editor and/or writer meet
with Chancellor Chambers and ask
for his assistance in this matter.
Needless tosay, the ABA's investigation will
not likely impact or assist thepresent 3L class.
However, the future 3L's can and should ben
efit from our willingness andability toquestion
and challenge perceived inequities and injus
tices. Isn't that why some of us are here?!?
By: Bill Olynick

404 (b) OR NOT 404 (b): IS THE QUESTION WHEN CHARACTER IS NOT CHARACTER
Professor Thomas M. Ringer, Jr. - North Carolina Central University School of Law

Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evi
dence is generally known as the "other purposes"
clause or the "other wrongs, crimes or acts" clause.
It reads as follows:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissiblefor other purposes, suchas proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake, entrapment or accident.
A clear understanding of Rule 401(b) requires an
examination of related rules that address the admis
sibility of cha racter evidence, such as 405(b) and
404(a). According to Brandis On North Carolina
Evidence, [cjharacter comprises the actual quali
ties andcharacteristics ofanindividual,thepeculiar
qualities impressed by nature and habit on the
person, which distinguish him from others (Page
As a general rule, character evidence is not admis
sible in either criminal cases or civil cases unless:
character is an ultima te issue in the case; or an
accused in a criminal case "opens the door" to her
pertinent character traits; or the defendant in a
criminal case "opens the door" to the character of
the victim of the alleg ed crim e, or character evi 
dence is involved in impeaching a witness in either
a criminal prosecution or a civil action.
The "other purposes" clause of Rule 404(b) pro
vides that other wrongs, crimes a- acts of an
individual may be adm itted for any rele vant pur
pose except to prove that the in dividual acted in
conformity with his character at the time in ques
tion. Therefore, Rule 404(b) does not constitute, an
exception to the pro pensity rule. Evidence of an
individual's wrongs, crimes or acts pursuant to Rule
404(b) are not admitted as character evidence, per
se. Rather, evidence of an individual's wrongs,
crimes or acts are admitted fa- seme purpose other
than to prove the character traits of the individual
In practice, Rule404(b) is a prosecutor's rule that
permits the State to circumvent the Propensity Rule
by introducing past wrongs, crimes and acts of the
defendant disguised as "other putposes" evidence.
More than ninety percent of the reported North
Carolina cases that ad dress Rule 404(b) involve
offers of proo f by the prosecution of "other pur
poses" evidence relating to the collateral wrongs,
crimes and acts of defendants in criminal cases.

At least one North Carolina appellate court deci
sion has stated that Rule404(b) is applicable only to
parties in civil cases and usually to defendants in
criminal cases. State v. Morgan, 315 N.C. 626,340
S.E.2d 84 (1986). However, the language of the
rule does not limit its application to the admission of
collateral wrongs ofparties. Yet, theNorthCarolina
supreme court recently rejected a defendant's con
tention that Rule 404(b) could be used to prove the
collateral acts of another individual as circumstan
tial evidence that the othe r individual and not the
defendantcommittedthecrimeinquestion State v.
Richardson, 328 N.C.505,402 S.E.2d 401 (1991).
In a similar case, the North Carolina courtof appeals
held that a defendant who was arrested, after a bag
of cocaine was found under the seat of the truck that
he was driving, was not entitled to offer in to evi
dence the criminal recotd of the owner of the track
for the purpo se of showing that the owner of the
track had probably acted in conformity with a
previous conviction by p lacing cocaine undo- the
seal The court held that the offer of proof was too
speculative. State v. Chandler, N.C. App. 706,398
S.E.2d 337 (1990).
A discussion of Rule404(b) is particularly timely
and topical in light of a trilogy of recent North
Carolina supreme court decisio ns that have ad
dressed the admissibility of "other purposes"
evidence pursuant to Rule404(b). In Statev.Agee,
the court upheld the admission of evidence relating
to a prior offense even though the def endant had
been acquitted of the prior offense. The court relied
upon the "chain of circumstances" or res gestae
doctrine to support the admission of the prior
offense evidence. State v. Agee, 391 S.E.2d 171
(1990).
In State v. Stager, the court upheld the murder
conviction of the defendant-wife for the murder by
firearm of her second husband. During the tr ial of
that case, the prosecution was allowed to off er
evidence surrounding thedeathby firearmof defen
dant-wife's first husband. The court upheld the
admission of thi s "other purposes" evidence even
tough the defendant-wife was never charged with
or tried for the murder of her first husband and even
tough the death of the first husband occurred
approximately ten years prior to the death of
defendant's second husba nd. State v Stager 406
S.E.2d 876 (1991).
The third and most intnguing of the cases was
State v.Scott. The court reversed the kidnapping
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and rape convictions of the defendant on the basis
that the trial court had improperly admitte d testi 
mony concerning a prior rape that had alleg edly
occurred two years earlier but which had resulted in
defendant's acquittal. The court held that the
prejudicial effect of admitting a prior of fense for
which the defendant had been acquitt ed would
clearly outweigh its probative value pursuant to a
Rule 403 analysis. State v. Scott, 413 S.E.2d 787
(1992).
In sum, these decisions raise nume rous issues
relating to the proper interpretation of Rule 404(b).
In Agee and Stager, the court followed a traditional
approach in admitting "other purposes" evidence
pursuant to Rules 404(b), 401 and 403. The more
recent Scott decision, however, signifies a marked
departure from established precede nt and repre
sents an apparent change in the court's a nalytical
approach and judicial attitude regarding the admis
sibility of collatera l wrongs, crimes or acts. The
majority opinion in Scott, authored by Chief Justice
Exum, cited favorably the dissenting opin ion of
Justice Brennan in Dowling v. United States, rather
than the majority opinion of Justice White, which
stated that evidence of a prior al leged offense for
which the defendant had been acquitted was no t
admissible.
It is worth noting that North Carolina Evidence
Rule 404(b) is modeled after an d tracks the lan 
guage of Federal Rule of Evidence404(b), with two
exceptions. The main difference being that the
Federal 404(b) rule includes a 1991 amen dment,
which was revised by deleting the period at the end
of the second sentence, and adding the follow
ing notice provision:
provided that upon request by the ac
cused, the prosecution in a criminal case
shall provide reasonable notice in ad
vance of trial, or during trial if the court
excuses pretrial notice on good cause
shown, of the general nature of any such
evidence it intends to introduce at trial."
[FRE 404(b) as amended effective De
cember 1,1991.]
Hopefully, the North Carolina General Assembly
will act promptly to add this notice provision to Rule
404(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. In
the meantime, counsel for defen dants in criminal
cases should continue to elicit this information
through discoveiy and to suppress impermissible
(Continued on page 15)

THE CASE FOR SUBMITTING
WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
G. Nicholas Herman - Adjunct faculty member at NCCU
Over two-hundred years ago, Sir William BJackstone wrote that trial by jury is die "grand bulwark of
[our] liberties."1 Yet, indie words of one trial judge, it is now commonly observed: "[w]henlread
instructions to the pry, I hope that I will see a light go on in thejurors' eyes, but I never do.'*1 This
rueful assessment has led a number of states to require that, along with oral instructions, thejury be
given written instructions to take to die jury room. If ourjury system is truly to remain the bulwark of
our liberties, North Carolina should do the same.
THE PROBLEM OFCOMPREHENSION

The ironyof the cunent North Carolina practice
of oral instructions to the jury, is that numerous
studies haveshown that jurors have great difficulty
understanding purely oral instructions. For ex
ample, in the early 1970s a major study showed
that 86%ofiurors incriminal cases misunderstood
the standard of proof to convict, and lessthan 50%
in civil cases understood the meaning of"probable
cause."3 Later studies revealed an equally dismal
portrait. Studies conducted in the mid 1970s
showed that nearly 50% of jurors believed that
"preponderance of the evidence" meant "a slow
and careful pondering of the evidence," and more
than 25% misunderstood definitions for "burden
of proof" "impeach,""admissible evidence," and
"inference."4
Still later, in the 1980s even more sophisticated
studies quantified the limited ability of juries to
understand oral instruct ions. For example, one
leading study of Texas jurors showed that only
19% understood the definition of "neg ligence;"
15% understood "probable cause;" 17% under
stood "presumption of innocence;" and 19%
understood instructions on "accomplice testi
mony."5
In sum, as bluntly put by one recent commen
tator "[ajll of the empirical studies show juror
comprehension of [oral] patten instructions to be
so tow as to be dysfunctional." 6 In contrast, a
number of these same studies have shown that
when jurors are provided written instructions, their
deliberations are more efficient; they are guided by
a greater understanding of the law; and they have
greater confidence in the correctness of their ver
dict7 Thus, it is not surprising that the most
frequent criticism of the jury-instruction pr ocess
from jurors themselves is that the instructions are
not provided to them in writing.8
NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE

Presently, the North Carolina General Statutes
neither require nor expressly prohibit submitting
written instructions to the jury. However, in State
v. Frank and State v. Pearce9 the Supreme Court
approved without requiring the practice of submit
ting to thejury written instructions on theelements

of offenses charged in a criminal case. Notwith
standing these decisions, undo- current North
Carolina practice written instructions are rarely - if
ever-submitted tothe jury incriminal orcivil cases.
This hasnot always been the practice. Beginning
in 1885,G.S. 1-182provided toatif any party to an
action requested that the trial judge put his instruc
tions in writing, "he must, at the request of either
party to the action, allow the jury to take his
instructions with themon their retirement..." The
failure to strictly comply with this statute in civilor
criminal cases required a new triaL10 In 1967, the
statutewasrevisedtoapplyto criminal cases only.11
Then, inexplicably, in 1977 the statute was reprealed
altogether.12
In its place, the legislature enactedRule51 of the
N.C. Rules of CivilProcedure, and G.S.15A-1231
applicabletooiminalcases. Thesestatutes prohibit
toe trial judge from giving opinions on the facts of
a caseor thejury's verdict and spellout the respon
sibilities of trial counsel in requesting specific
instructions from the court Nothing is said about
submitting written instructions to the jury.
PRACTICE IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

As aresponse to the problem of jury comprehension, approximately twenty state have, at one time
or another, permitted the submission written in
structions in civil cases;13 and almost thirty have
permitted the practice in criminal cases. 14 In as
many astwenty states toe legislatures and courts are
now silent on the subject and approximately four
states have prohibited the practice outright in certain
cases.15
Of those states that allow the submission of
written instructions, some - asin federal practice leave toe matte solely to the discretion of the trial
judge,16 while others require the practice upon
request of a party or the jury itself.17 At least six
states make the practice mandatory.18
When the submission of written instructions is
permitted, the trial judge is still required to first
charge the jury orally. Thewrilteninstructionsmust
then consist of thecomplete final oral charge given
by the trial judge. In addition, a number of cases
have held that the instructions submitted should not
be tainted b y underlinings, interlineat ions, nota11
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tions,crossed-outpx)rtionsofthe text, or incom
plete erasures.19
ADVANTAGES AND DANGERS

The mostobvious advantage of written instruc
tions is th at they markedly enhance the jury's
comprehension of toe applicable law. Also, they
permit juries to be more efficient and focused in
their deliberations by eliminating excessive de
bates about what the trial judge charged orally.20
In light of these advantages, and because of toe
critical importance that juries follow toe law as
instructed by toe court, it mayseem curious that
toe practice of submitting written instructions has
not been readily adopted in all jurisdictions.
Some courts and commentators have sug
gested certain dangers and practical problems in
providing written instructions to the jury 21 The
most common of theseare: (1) that toe jury may
misinterpret the instructions and debate the law;
(2) that the jury may give undue emphasis to toe
written instructions and de-emphasize toe fact
finding function; a nd (3) that the courts have
limited time and resources to make written in
structions available to thejury.22 However, there
are sound reasons why these reservations are
unfounded. First, t he suggestion that toe jury
might misinterpret the written instructions is fun
damentally belied by their very purpose. The
jury's ability to read the instructions militates
against misinterpretation rather than fostering it
Cautionary instructions should be given to toe
jury that toe written materials are submitt ed to
assist them in refreshing their recollection of toe
trial judge's oral charge. Also, it should be
emphasized that toe jury shouldalwaysrequest an
explanation or clarification of toe law directly
fiomthecourL Therefore, any risk of misinterpre
tation or debate about toe law would be no greater
than if the jury was only charged orally.23
Second, thedanger that the jury might overem
phasize the written instructions and subordinate
deliberations a bout toe evidence may also be
overcome by appropriate cautionary instruc
tions.24 O ne studyfound thatjuries given written
instructions actually "concentrated more on toe
relevant facts."25 In addition, if toe written
(Continued on page 12)
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inslructions embody the trial judg e's complete
oral charge, any risk that the jury might give
undue emphasis to any portion of theinstructions
would again be no greater than if no written
instructions woe provided at all
Finally, the notion that courts have limited
time and resources to make written instructions
available to the jury is simply outdatedbytoday's
trial procedure and word-processor technology.
Under cunent North Carolina procedure, as in
moststates, a conferenceon inslructions must be
held between the trial judge and counsel in
advance of delivering final instructions to the
jury.26 During such a conference,the trial judge
couldeasily delegate theresponsibility for typing
and duplicating his final instructions to one of the
parties for the jury. Anyminordelayoccasioned
by that process would be far outweighed by the
benefits of providing written instructions.
In summary, the advantages of submitting
written instructions to the jury greatly outweigh
any perceived dangers or practical difficulties.
Accordingly, the overwhelming authorities that
have examined the subject have strongly advo
cated sending written instructions to the jury
room.27
ADOPTING A NEW RULE

The North Carolina General Rules of Practice
for thesuperior and district courts, which include
rules related to jury instructions,25 are promul
gated by the supreme courtwhich is"authorized
to prescribe rules of practice and procedure for
the superior and district courts supplementary to,
and not inconsistent with acts of the general
assembly."29 Because there are no North Caro
lina statutory provisions that expressly prohibit
submitting written instructions to the jury,30 any
rule authorizing this practice could be promul
gated by die supreme court alone.
In adopting a rulethat wouldauthorize submit
ting written instructions to the jury, the following
procedures would be desirable:
(1) The rule should require the submission
of written instructions in civil and criminal
cases upon motion of anyparty at the jury
conference,31 or upon the trial judge's
own initiative.
(2) The written instructi ons should em
body the final, verbatim oral charge given
by the trial judge to the jury, and made a
part of the record.
(3) The responsibility for typing and
duplicating the written instructions should
rest with the party requesting the submis-

sion or, inthe event both parties make the
request, upon the party with the burden of
proof.
(4) When the jury retires for deliberations,
acopy ofthe written instructions should be
provided to each juror s o that each has
equal access to the instructions during
deliberations.32
(5) The written instruc tions should not
contain underscoring, interlineations, no
tations, crossed-out portions of the text, or
incomplete erasures.33
(6) The written instructions (and the oral
charge) should contain cautionary instruc
tions to theeffect that the written materials
are solely given as an a id to the jury's
comprehension of the oral charge, and that
the jury should always directly consult the
court for any explanation or clarification
about the instructions.34
CONCLUSION

Most judgesand trial lawyers would agree that
jurors are generally conscientious and discharge
their duty with a genuine sense of responsibility.
This salutary observation, however, cannot over
come the limitations that hour-long oral
instructionsplaceupon the jury's ability to under
stand the applicable law. To suppose that our
current jury-instruction practice is adequate to the
jury's task issimply belied by common seaseas
wellasempiricalresearch. Thus,NorthCarolina's
supreme courtshould adopt a new ruleauthoriz
ing the submission of written instructions to the
jury. Doing so would go a long way in relieving
the jury from having to go , as Judge Learned
Hand put it, "rummaging through a wildaness of
veibage."35
Edited byWJ.O.
The Barrister would like to thank Attorney
G. Nicholas Herman and the North Carolina
State Bar Quarterly for permission to publish
this edited version of the Fall1992 copyrighted
article.
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improving world of science. The court recog
nized that the reason for allowing expert testi
mony under North Carolina Rule 702 is that
neither a lay jury nor a judge can "know" all
relevant information that may assist the trier-offacttoreachan informeddecision. Furthermore,
the court recognized that in certain circum
stances nearperfect psychological evidencemay
be as valuable, if not more valuable, than actual
physical evidence. For example, in a rape trial,
where the defendant is claiming consent by the
victim, symptoms of PTSD can aid the jury. As
Light on the Rape HALLway:
one commentator has stated on therelevanceof
(continued from page 9)
rape trauma syndrome (RTS), a form of PTSD:
[T]hal definition makes psychological
"bruises" asarelevantasphysicalbruises
nizing that a lay jury is highly likely to bepersuaded
in a consent-rape trial. Both certainly
by expert testimony of PTS D or conversion, the
court protects the essential function of the jury; the
may resultfrommany causes. Neitherthe
jury, not the expert, is the finder of facts.
physician who testifies that a woman has
The Hall court followed established evidentiary
physical bruises nor a psychobgist who
rules forexample Rule403, bydemonstrating how
testifies that a woman suffers from RTS
PTSD and conversion evidence can create a
can state unequivocally that the condition
"danger" of unfair prejudice" to the defendant In
was caused by a specific incident of non
deciding, therefore, to disallow PTSD andconver
consensual intercourse, yet the evidence
sion evidence for the purpose of proving an actual
of a victim's physical injuries is deemed
rape, the Hall court ensures that the guilt or
cleanly relevant inarape case andadmisinnocence of a defendantwill be determined by an
sibility of this is beyond doubt}9
unprejudiced jury.
Therefore, the Hall court had two very good
Yet in notcreating a per se ban on theadmissi
reasons to follow the lead ofNew York's highest
bility of PTSD and conversion evidence, the Hall
court, by allowing the limited admissibility of
court demonstrated the use of flexible rules that a
PTSD and conversion evidence. First, by creat
courtshouldemploy inorderto copewith theevering the ru le that tire purpose the evidence is being
offeredforwilldetermineits
admissibility, the North
CarolinaSupremeCourthas
given tria l judges the flex
ibility to deal with innova
tive and unreviewed uses of
PTSD. Second, thesupreme
courthasrecognizedthatevidence ofPTSD is a valuable
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admissibility of PTSD evidence, the dissent
failed to recognize inherent danger of putting
the rape victim on trial rather than the defendant
Most jurisdictions, including North Carolina,
have enacted rape-shield statutes to specifically
avoid the focus of the trial from failing on the
victim's previous sexual conduct and to prohibit
the defense from probing into the past of the
victim.20 While evidence of PTSD does not
deal with previous sexual conduct of the victim,
the effect of allowing the defense to probe into
the trauma of the victim is potent ially just as
damaging, creating a real danger of confusing
the jury as to who is truly on trial.21 This is much
more likely if PTSD andconversion are offered
for substantive evidence because the jury will
be allowed to occur to determine whether the
victim was raped by looking at the resulting
trauma, not as the facts existing at the time of
alleged crime.
The Hall decision, however, does leave some
questions unanswered. F or instance, in a rape
case where the defendant does not raise the
issue of consent, such as in/Mhow willa jury
be able to differentiate between PTSD evidence
offered for credibility purposes and not for
substantive purposes. Ev en with a strong lim
iting instruction by the judge, isn't a jury likely
to draw the c onclusion that PTSD means the
victim must have suffered some trauma? In
addition, in a case where the jury is asked to
differentiate between rape, attempted rape,
sexualassault, attempted sexual assault,orsome
other sex-related offense, what benefit will
PTSDevidenceprovideindeterminingwhether
technical statutory elements have been met? A
jury may be likely to confuse evidence of
trauma as evidence of the greater crime and not
focus on the particular requirements of each
crime.
Another unanswered question is what would
happen in a rape case where the defendan t
presentsevidencethatthe alleged victim has not
suffered from PTSD? As one commentator
suggests, courts mayriskestablishingthatPTSD
is an unofficial element of rape." Yet another
risk is that the jury may not feel that the statutory
elements, dealing with lack of consen t by the
victim, are met unless the victim has suffered
PTSD. ThefinalquestionnotaddressedinHall
is how does the evidentiary value and admissi
bility literati ons change when PTSD is pre
sented in a civil case? Undoubtedly, creative
lawyers will seek the answers to these ques
tions; letushope that our courts have the "right"
answers.
CONCLUSION

The decision in Hall does represent the grow-

(Continued on page 14)

Light on the Rape HALLway:
(continued from page 13)
ing acceptance of psychological testimony in
American jurisdiction. If anything, Hall repre
sents a signal to women th k North Carolina
courts arc dedicated to protecting women from
rape offenders.
The purpose of the PTSD and conversion
evidence determines admissibility, but that pur
pose can not be to prove that the rape actually
occurred, In addition to helping lower courts,
this rule will enable lawyers to esta blish new
waysof usingPTSDandconversionevidenceat
triaL It remains to beseen, however, upon the re
trial of Donnie Ray Hall, whether the jurors,
particularly, c an a jury of twelve reasonable
minds differentiate betw een evidence offered
for corroborative as opposed tosubstantive pur
poses.

By: Jerry Smith
Edited by WJO
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404 (b) OR NOT 404 (b):
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collateral wrongs, crimes or acts by filing timely
motions in limine.
As the above preliminary discussion of s ome of
the issues raised in recent North Carolina and
federal appellate cases suggests, Rule 404(b) does
not laid itself to a simple or mechanical application.
The courts and litigants must address she factors in
determining the admissibility of "other purposes"
evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the North
Carolina Rules of Evidence:
1. IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC "OTHER
PURPOSES" WHICH THE EVIDENCE OF
OTHER WRONGS, CRIMES OR ACTS
MAY PROVE.
The threshol d consideratio n is to identify the
specific purpose(s) for which collateral wrongs,
crimes or acts would be admissible. The second
sentence of Rule404(b) of the North Carolina Rules
of Evidence lists ten "pigeonholes" or "other pur
poses" which prior or subsequent offenses may
prove: "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plans, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake,
entrapment or accident." (Rule404(b) of the North
Carolina Rules of Evidence). In addition to the ten
categorical puiposes s tated in Rule 404(b), "ther e
are numerous other uses to which evidence of
criminal acts may be put, and those enumerated are
neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaus
tive." (McCormick On Evidence, Fourth Edition,
page 345). Several examples include the"chain of
circumstances" or resgestae purpose; acts of ill-will
to prove malice; uniqu e modus operandi; and to
show a passion for unusual or abnormal sexual
relations.
The proponent of the "other purposes" evidence
(typically, the prosecuting attorney) bears the bur
den of iden tifying the speci fic purpose(s) that the
other wrong, crime or act would tend to prove . In
appropriate cases, the opponent to the admission of
the "other puiposes" evidence should specifically
object to the evidence on the ground that it does not
fall within the "other purposes" claus e of Rule
404(b) sod, if the court overrules the objection, the
opponent should force the proponent's attorney to
state for the record the specific purpose for which
the collateral wrong, crime or act is being offered.
The main two advantages that the opponent gains
by compelling the proponen t t o state the explicit
purpose fa which the collateral evidence is being
tendered: (1) sometimes the proponent Ls unable on
the spur of the moment to correctly identify the
applicable 404(b) purpose; and (2) the statement of
aparticular404(b)purpose has theeffect of painting
the proponent of the evidence into acorner. During
closing arguments or on appeal, the proponent
cannot rely upon some other404(b) purposethat he

did not previou sly iden tify. Also, by forcing the
proponent of the evidence to explici tly state the
purpose for which the collateral offense is being
offered, the opponent is laying the groundwork for
a possible appe al in the event th at the propone nt
failed to state a proper pu rpose for admi tting the
collateral evidence.
2. DETERMINE THE LOGICAL REL
EVANCY AND MATERIALITY OF THE
"OTHER PURPOSES" EVIDENCE PUR
SUANT TO RULE 401.
The next consideration is to determine whether
the collateral wrongs, crimes, or acts are relevant
pursuant to Rule 401 of the North Carolina Rules
of Evidence. Although evidence of a collateral
event may fall within one or more of the other
purposes listed in Rule 404(b), eviden ce of the
collateral event is not admissible unless the offer of
proof is logically relevant as defined in Rule 401
of the Rules of Evidence:
Relevant Evidence" means evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determina
tion of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evi
dence. [emphasis added]
This definition embraces two important
evidentiary concepts—relevancy and materiality.
Tosatisfy the two-fold requirements of Rule 401, an
offer of proof made pursuant to Rule 404(b) must
first have a tendency to prove either a listed or
unlisted purpose pursuant to Rule 404(b) and sec
ond, the purpose must fall within the range of
allowableproof as determinedby theclaims, charges
or defenses raised in the particular case. In toe v.
Rowland, the North Caro lina Court of Appeals
stated:
Before extrinsic conduct evidence is admis
sible pursuant to Rule 404(b), the trial court
is required to first determine whether conductisbeingcfferedpursuanttoRule404(b);
second, the trial court is required to make a
determination of the evidence's relevancy.
Statev.Rowland,366SE2d550,556(1988).
The North Caroli na Suprem e Court has de
scribed logical relevancy as "the touchstone" in
deciding whether extrinsic evidence is admissible
under Rule 404(b). State v. Fowler, 230 N.C. 470,
53 S.E.2d 853 (1949). The court has also stated that
the "acid test" fa determining whether evidence of
collateral events falls with in Rule 404(b) is "its
logical relevancy to the particular purpose fa which
it is sought to be introduced." State v. Jeter, 326
N.C. 457,389 S.E.2d 805 (1990).
McCormick On Evidence points out that the "other
puiposes" which the extrinsic evidence purports to
prove must be in controversy:
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[TJhe connection between the evidence and
the permissible purpose should be clear, and
the issue on which the other crimes evidence
is said to bear should be the subject of a
genuine controversy. For example, if the
prosecution maintains that the other crime
reveals defendant's guilty state of mind, then
his intent must be disputed. Thus, if the
defendant does not deny that the acts were
deliberate, then the prosecution may not
introduce the evidence merely to show that
the acts were not accidental. Likewise, if the
accused does not deny performing the acts
charged, the exceptions pertaining to identi
fication are unavailing. McCormick On
Evidence, 4th Ed. pages 346-347.
Also, in determining the probative value of an
extrinsic act, the remo teness in time of the prior
event diminishes its probati ve value. The North
Carolina supreme court has held that evidence of
similar prior sexual assaults by the defendant which
happenkl seven years before the sexual assault in
question was prejudicial to defendant's fundamen
tal right to a fair trial because the prior acts were too
remote in time. [State v. Jones, 322 N.C. 585,369
S.E.2d822 (1988)]. Rule4Q2 of the North Carolina
Rules of Evidence pro vides in pe rtinent part th at
"relevant evidence is admissible" unless excluded
by some other rule of law and that "[ejvidence that
is not relevant is not admissible."
3. DETERMINE IF THE "OTHER PUR
POSES" EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO
PROVETHATTHEDEFENDANTCOMMITTED THE COLLATERAL ACT.
The third step in analyzing the admissibility of
other wrongs, crimes or acts evidence, is to deter
mine whether the evidence is sufficient to prove that
the parly (usually the defendant in a criminal case)
actually committed the collateral act In 1988, the
United States Supreme Court addressed this burden
of production issue in Huddleston v. United States,
485 U.S. 681, 108 S. a 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771
(1988). The Supreme Court held:
We conclude that a preliminary finding by
the court that the Government has proved
the act by a preponderance of the evidence is
not called for under Rule 104(a)... In the
Rule 404(b) context, similar act evidence is
relevant if the jury can reasonably conclude
that the act occurred and that the defendant
was the actor. (Huddleston, 108 S.Ct. 1496,
1501).
Therefore, the Court in Huddleston proceeded to
adopt the conditional relevancy standard provided
in Rule 104(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence:
In determining whether the Government has
introduced sufficient evidence to meet Rule

(Continued on page 16)
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104(b), the trial court neither weighs
credibility nor makes a finding that the
Government has proved the conditional fact
by a preponderance of the evidence. The
court simply examines all the evidence in the
case and decides whether the jury could
reasonably find the conditionalfact ...by
a preponderance of the evidence. ... Often
the trial court may decide to allow the pro
ponent to introduce evidence concerning a
similar act, and at a late r point in the trial
assess whether sufficient evidence has been
offered to permit thejury to make the requi
site finding. (Huddleston, 108 S.Ct 1496,
1501).
Although the Huddleston standard has become
known as the "sufficiency of evidence" standard, a
careful readin g of the case reveals that the Co urt
actually adop ted the Rule 104( b) conditional rel
evance standard:
When the relevancy of evidence depends
upon the•fuffillmentqfa condition of fact, the
court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the
introduction of evidence sufficient to supportafindingofthefuffillmentofthecondition.
Now the North Caroli na Supreme Court has
purportedly adopted the Huddlest on burden of
production standard. In State v. Stager, pa Justice
Mitchell stated:
In Huddleston, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that evidence may be
admitted under Rule 404(b) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence if there is sufficient evi
dence to support a jury finding that the
defendant committed the similar act; no
preliminaryfinding by the trial court that the
defendant actuetily committed such an act is
required. Huddleston, 485 US. at 687-88
108S.Ct. at 1500-01,99LEd2dat 781. We
find the reasoning of Huddleston compel
ling and conclude that evidence is admissible
under Rule 404(b) of the North Carolina
Rules ofEvidence f it is substantial evidence
tending to support a reasonable finding by
the jury that the defendant committed a
similar act or crime and its probative value
is not limited solely to tending to establish the
defendanf s propensity to commit a crime
such as the crime charged. State v. Stager,
329 N.C. 278,406 SE2d 876,890 (1991)'.
It is interesting to note that even though the North
Carolina Supreme Court has ostensibly adopted the
Huddleston stand ard, the court neithe r discusses
nor invokes the termino logy of conditional rel

evancy in conjunction with its analysis of Rule
404(b) offers of proof. Instead, theCourthascoined
its own phrase, "substantial evidence", as the stan
dard to be applied in determining whether the
proponent of "other purposes" evidence has pro
duced enough evidence to connect the defendant to
the collateral event It should also be noted that
North Carolina Rule 104(b), the con ditional rel
evancy rule, is identical to its federal counterpart It
appears, though, that contr ary to the rationale of
Huddleston, the "substantial evidence" standard
adopted by the North Ca rolina Supreme Court in
Stager, Agee and Scott is treated as a part of a
preliminary question analysis pursuan t to Rule
101(a), raiher than as a question of conditional
relevancy pursuant to Rule 101(b). These tworules
operate quite differently. The trial judge determines
the prelimin ary question of admissibility under
Rule 104(a). "In making its determination, [the trial
court] is not bound by the rules of evidence except
those with respect to privilege." [Rule 104(a)],
Conditional relevanc y (101b), on the other hand,
authorizes the trial court to admit, to the jury,
evidence of the collatera l act, before evidence is
offered establish ing the fact that the defendant
actually committed the collateral acL If the p ropo
nent does not offer "sufficient evidence" to prove
that the defendant committed the collateral act, thai
according to the language of Rule 101(b), the
conditionhas not been fulfilled and the judgeshould
withdraw evidence of the coll ateral fact from the
jury. The burden is on the opponoit, however, to
makeamotiontostrikeevidoiceof thecollateral act
if theproponent does not offer"sufficient evidence"
to fulfill the condition
To summarize, a collateral wrong, crime or act is
admissible under Rule404(b) of the North Carolina
Rules of Evidence if the proponent of the evidence
is able to produce "substantial evidence tending to
support a reasonable finding b y the jury that the
defendant committed a .similar actor crime." (p. 890
of Stager). The substantial evidence standard is a
relatively low threshold requirement It is a much
Iowa buitien of proof standard than the burden of
persuasion standard applied in c riminal trials (beyond areasonabledoubt). The"suhstantialevidcixe"
standard merely requires that the proponent of the
collateral wrong, crime or act produce enough
credible and competent eviden ce connecting the
defendant to the collateral event that the j ury's
decision on this issue would not be overturned.
Although the term "substantial evidence" gives the
impression that an enormous amount of evidence is
required to link the defendant to the collateral event,
in reality the standard is a low quantum of proof
requirement that demands only the pro duction of
"some evidence" connecting the defendant to the
commission of the collateral event.
4. DETERMINE WHETHER THE ADMIS-
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SIONOFTHE PRIOR OFFENSEWOULD BE
BARRED BY THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY
CLAUSE OR BY THE DOCTRINE OF COL
LATERAL ESTOPPEL.
The next step is to analyze the issues of collateral
estoppel and double jeopardy wh en the collateral
crime offered into evidence at the present trial has
been the subject of a previous adjudicatioa
A difficult issue arises when the prosecutor in the
present criminal trial offers evidence of a collateral
crime for which the defendant was previously
acquitted or which resulted in a mistrial. The
Double Jeopardy clause of the Constitution and the
principles of res judicata and collateral esto ppel
normally preclude the re-litigation of the issue of
guilt once a final judgment on a case or issue has
been entered. The preclusive effect of prior adjudi
cations on the admission of "other purposes"
evidence has been the subject of numerous appel
late decisions in both the federal court s and the
courts of North Carolina.
Dowling v. United States, 110 S.Ct. 668 (1990),
is a landmark decision of the United States Supreme
Court that addressed the admissibility of collateral
offenses against a defendant even though the defen
dant has beenpreviously acquitted of thoseoffenses.
The Court in Dowling first discussed an earlier
Suprone Court decision:
In Ashe v. Swenson, 397 US. 90 S.Ct.
1189,25 LEd.2d469 (1970), we recognized
that the Double Jeopardy Clause incorpo
rates the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In
thatcase.agroupofmaskedmenhadrobbed
six men playing poker in the basement of a
home. The State unsuccessfully prosecuted
Ashe for robbing one of the men. Sa weeks
later, however, the defendant was convicted
for the robbery of one of the other players.
Applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel
which we found implicit in the Double Jeop
ardy Clause, we reversed Ashe's conviction,
holding that his acquittal in the first trial
precluded the State from charging him for
the second offense. We defined the collateral
estoppel doctrine as providing that "when
an issue of ultimate fact has once been
determined by a valid and final judgment,
that issue cannot again be litigated between
the same parties in any future lawsuit."
Ashe's acquittal in the first trial foreclosed
the second trial because, in the circum
stances of that case, the acquittal verdict
could only have meant that the jury was
unable to conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was one of the
bandits. A second prosecution was imper
missible because, to have convicted the
(Continued on page 17)
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defendant in the second trial, die second jury
had to have reached a directly contrary
conclusion. Dowling v. United States, 110
S.Ct. 668,671-72 (1990).
The facts in Dowling were that the defendant was
charged with armed robbery while wearing a mask.
As proof of his identity, the prosecution offered into
evidence the testim ony of a witness that she had
been robbed in her hone by a masked robber
several weeks before the armed robbery in queslioa She testified that defendant was the person
who had robbed her. The defendant, however, had
been previously acquitted of committing the p rior
robbery of the female witness. In the Dowling
decision, the Court distinguished the facts in
Dowling Iran the facts in Ashe v. Swenson:
... [Ujnlike the situation in Ashe v. Swenson,
the prior acquittal did not determine an
ultimate issue in the present case... andwe
decline to extend Ashe v. Swenson and the
collateral estoppel component of the Double
Jeopardy Clause to exclude in all circum
stances ... relevant and probative evidence
that is otherwise admissible under the Rules
of Evidence simply because it relates to
alleged criminal conduct for which a defen
dant has been acquitted. [Dowlingv.United
States, 110 S.Ct. 668(1990)].
Therefore, the critical test under Dowling is
whether the prior acquittal determined an ultimate
issue in the present case. If so, then evidence of the
prior offense would be excluded. If not, then
evidence of the prior offense would not be pre
cluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause or by the
doctrine of collateral estoppel even though the
defendant was acquitted of committing the alleged
prior offense.
The North Carolina Supreme Court was con
fronted with this same issue in State v. Agee, 391
S.E.2d 171 (1990). The North Carolina Supreme
Court held, pa JusticeWhichard, that in defendant's
criminal tria l for felonio us possession of LSD, it
was not reversible error for the trial court to admit
evidence of defendant's possession of marijuana to
show a chain of circumstances related to die LSD
possession charge despite the fact that the defendant
had been previously acquitted of the possession of
marijuana charge. According to Justice Whichard,
ihe previous acquitta l on the marijuana charge
would not be precluded because "the prioracquittal
did not determine an ultimate issue in the present
case." [YlLolState v. Agee, citing Ashe v. Swenson,
397 U.S. 436 (1970) and Dowling v. United States,
493 U.S. 342 (1990)].

The North Carolina Supreme Court reconsidered
this issue mState v. Scott,413 S.E.2d787 (1992). In
Scott, the defendant was tried on several charges
including rape, kidnapping and crime a gainst na
ture. At the trial, the prosec ution introduc ed the
testimony of awitness (not the prosecuting witness)
that two years earlia, the defendant had raped her
unda circumstances similar to the alleged rape for
which the defendant was then on trial. T hedefendanihad beentried and acquitted of the alleged prior
rape. In a carefully written opinion, Chief Justice
Exum, speaking for the majority of the court stated:
We conclude that evidence that defendant
committed a prior alleged offense for which
he has been tried and acquitted may not be
admitted in a subsequent trial for a different
offense when its probative value depends, as
it did here, upon the proposition that the
defendant in fact committed the prior crime.
To admit such evidence violates, as a matter
oflaw,EvidenceRule403. Statev. Scott,•413
SE.2d 787 (1992).
The Court concluded:
The North Carolina Rules of Evidence must
be interpreted and applied in light of this
proposition: anacquittalandtheundefeated
presumption of innocence it signifies mean
that, in law, defendant did not commit the
crime charged. When the probative value of
evidence of this other conduct depends upon
the proposition that defendant committed
the prior crime, his earlier acquittal of that
crime so erodes the probative value of the
evidence that its potential for prejudice,
which is great, must perforce outweigh its
probative value under Rule 403. State v.
Scott, 413 SE2d 787 (1992).
The court reversed the kidnapping and rape con
victions but upheld the crime against nature
conviction. The court's rationale was that evidence
of the prior sexual offense (fa whichthe defaidani
had been acquitted) pertained to the issue of consent
in the case sub judice. Cons ent is not a defense to
acrime against nature chargeand the impermissible
admission of the pria offense evidence did not taint
the aime against nature conviction
The court's decision in Scott would appear to be
in conflict with its decision in Agee,even though the
court attempted to distinguish the two cases on both
the facts and the law. In a dissenting opinion to the
majority opinion in Scott, Justice Meya points out
that the majority opinion appears to be a departure
from the co urt's traditional a nalysis of co llateral
estoppel andofthcbalancingtest found in Rule403.
(1) It is clear that if the pr ia adjudicatiai deter
mined an "ultimate issue in the present case", as in
Ashe v. Swenson, then evidence of the pria offense
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that resulted in an acqui ttal would be b arred. (2)
Also, if the prior adjuciadon did not determine an
"ultimate issue in the present case", then the prior
adjudication would be admissible in the subsequent
case, unless the court determines, as InState v. Scott,
that it would be unfair purs uant to a Rule 403
analysis to admit evidence of the pria offensethat
resulted in the acquittaL Scott thus create s an
important exception to case s such as Dowli ng v.
United States and State v. Agee.
5. DETERMINE WHETHER THE PROBATIVEVALUE OFTHE "OTHER PURPOSES"
EVIDENCE IS SUBSTANTIALLY OUT
WEIGHED BY UNFAIR PREJUDICE
PURSUANT TO RULE 403.
The Rule 403 test is refe rred to as the "legal
relevancy test and should be distinguished from the
"logical relevancy" test stated in Rule 401. Rule
403 provides as follows:
Although relevant, evidence may be ex
cluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair preju
dice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
thejury, or by considerations ofundue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence, [emphasis added]
The inherent nature of "other purposes" evidence
creates thedanger that the introduction of collateral
wrongs, crimes or acts of a defendant in a criminal
case might lead the jury to reach a ve rdict on an
impropa basis; the jury may intentionally or unwit
tingly conclude that since the defendant committed
otha crimes, he probably committed the crime in
questioa Once the jury is made aware of collateral
events, it is difficult to control the manner in which
the jury will consider and weigh this evidence. For
this reason, 404(b) evidence should not be intro
duced unless it is clear that the prejudicial effect of
the "otha purposes" evidence would not substan
tially outweigh its probative value.
In orda toavoid the prejudicial effects that might
result if the jury hears testimony conconing a
collateral act , it is recommended that co unsel for
defendant in a criminal case consida taking the
following steps:
1. Request through discovery a copy of the
Defendant's prior criminal record from the pros
ecution and (though not listed in the discovery
statute) any additional information of prior
wrongs a acts that the prosecutor plans to
introduce.
2. File a pre-trial motion in limine to exclude the
introduction of collataal wrongs, oim es and
acts.
3. Make specific objections based on Rules 401,
403 and 404(b) to the ruli ng of the tri al court
admitting collateral wrongs, crimes and acts.
(Continued on page 18)
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4. Make a motion to strike evidence of the
collateral wrongs, crimes a- acts if there is not
"substantial evidence" toconnect the defendant
to the collateral act
5. Make a motion for a limiting instruction and
provide to the court a proposed limiting instructioa
6. Submit to the court a memorandum of law or
trial brief in support of the exclusion of 404(b)
evidence.
7. Providecopies of relevant favorabledecisions
to the court (e.g. State v. Scott).
8. Make a motion for a mistrial (if appropriate).
9. Make a motion fa- a new trial (if appropriate).
10. Lay the groundwork for an ap peal and be
prepared to appeal

6. APPLY THE DOCTRINE OF LIMITED
ADMISSIBILITY PURSUANT TO RULE 105.
The final step in determining the admissibility of
"other purposes" evidence arises from the applica
tion of thedoctrineof limited admissibility found in
Rule 105 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence.
The rule provides as follows:
When evidence which is admissible as to
one party or for one purpose but not admis
sible as to another party or for another
purpose is admitted, the court, upon request.
shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope
and instruct the jury accordingly.
The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 105 of
the North Carolina Rules of Evidence states in
pertinent part:
A cbse relationship exists between this rule
and Rule403which requires exclusionwhen
"probativevalue is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury." The
present rule recognizes the practice of ad
mitting evidence for a limited purpose and
instructing the jury accordingly. The avail
ability and effectiveness of this practice must
be taken into consideration in reaching a
decision whether to excludefor unfair preju
dice under Rule 403.
Evidence which is admitte d pursuant to Rule
404(b) may be considered b y the jury only to the
extent that i t proves one or more of the "other
purposes" to which it was admitted. "Other pur
poses" evidence may not be considered by the jury
as proof that the defendant may have acted at the
time in question in a manner cons istent with her
character, because as stated earlier, the propensity
rule [Rule 404(a)] excludes the introduction of
circumstantial character evidence Normally, the

judge restricts tie jury's consideration of evidence
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts by giving a limiting
instruction to the jury. T he essence of the limiting
instruction is that the jury may consider evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts of the defendant only
for purposes of determining whether the prosecu
tion has established proof of specific "oth er
purposes" pursuant to Rule 404(b).
In State v. Stager, (the murder case in which the
defendant-wfe was found guilty of killing her sec
ond husband), the trial court did not give a limiting
instruction to the jury. Presumably, the jury consid
ered the evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts for
any and all purposes. Despite the failure of the trial
court to give a limiting instruction, the North Caro
lina supreme court held that a limiting instruction is
not required "unless specifically requested by coun
sel." [State v. Stager, 401 S.E.2d 876,894 (1991)].
The Court's ruling in this regard is consistent with
Rule 105 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence
which provides that a limiting instruction shall be
given "upon request" in an appropria te situation
The danger exists, however, that in the absence of
a limiting instruc tion, the ju ry will proba bly con
sider tlx;"othcrpurposes"evidence ascircmnstantial
character evidence — a result that would clearly
contravene the propensity rule.
CONCLUSION

An analysis of the "other purposes" clause of
Rule404(b) would be incomplete without a discus
sion of the u nderlying rationale of this rule. The
primary policy justification i n support of Rule
404(b) is that it pr ovides a means of introduc ing
relevant evidence that might be otherwise excluded
by the propensity rule. Some legal commentators
believe that justice is best served when the jury is
given all of the rel evant facts. The counter-argu
ment, of cours e, is that Rule 404(b) is merel y a
subterfuge to the admission of highly prejudicial
circumstantial character evidence. Rule 404(b) is
essentially a "prosecutor's rule" that enables a
prosecutor to present to the jury character evidence
disguised as "other purposes" evidence. Once the
jurors have heard "other purposes" evidence, the
efficacy of limiting instructions is questionable.
Our role as litigators and as officers of the court is
to mitigate the potentially prejudicial effect of
"other purposes" evidence so that justice might
prevail

Edited by: WJO
The Barrister editors would like to thank Profes
sor Ringer for allowing us to publish this edited
version of his article. You may wish to read his
+111,000 word version in a soon to be published
NCCU Law Journal.

PARK IT: UPDATE
In the last edition of The Barrister it was re
ported that the availability ofstudentparking was
homendously inadequate. (Over 400 day law &
criminal justice students compete for 45 student
assigned parking spaces.) Since then,the Univer
sity has added approximately one hundred and
forty student piking spaces across from the
Criminal Justice building - a step in the right
direction, in addition, the University is looking
into other potential parking sites and satellite
parking. Dr. Percy Murray is the chairperson of
the University Facilitator Planning Committee.
There isof course, the questions concerning the
need and statutory requirement of adequate
handicap parking, as well as the apparent exces
sive ^'(faculty/staff) designated parking spaces
surrounding the law schooL these mattersshould
be discussed andaddressed in the next edition of
The Barrister.

By: WJO

UPDATE: LEGAL
WRITING IS ILLEGAL
In the previous The Barrister an articleauthored
by David Lambert set forth the facts which clearly
showed that the majority of Instructors/Professors,
involved in the most subjective matter cours es legal writing courses - were routinely ignoring the
Law School's own rules. The rule is that ALL
GRADING ISTO BE ANONYMOUS. The rule
does not say except f or, or jn cases of: or the
exceptions are.
Moreover, the law school hasat leastone writing
instructor who blatantly refused ANY anonymity
in grading when she DEMANDED STUDENTS
NOT USE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS.
Students were told to cross outtheir social security
numbers and insert their NAMES.
The LawSchool Administration was made aware
of the above through student evaluations as well as
several "one on ones."
Since the previous publication the adminstration
has said and done nothing to correct these prac
tices. The Barrister will ask the SBA to bring the
matter before the Faculty during afaculty meeting.
The Barristerwill attempt to meet withChancellor
Chambers to ask for his assistance in this matter.

By: WJO
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PART II: WHAT THE "L" IS GOIN' ON
Another Opinion: Is Law School Worth It?
Or, Have I or Am I Making the Biggest Mistake of My Life?!
This is a continuation of the article pre
sented in the last edition of The Barris
ter. We offer it for comic relief
Professor James Gordon Ill's1 satirical look at
law school in all of its radiant glory (or is itgory?)
suggests that one may be far "better off' being a
spelling coach for D an Quayle or obtaining a
PhD. (pile it higher a nd deeper) in Quantum
Melodies of the Spheres, then to consider the
ludicrous, horrendous, helacious experience of
law school and the ungodly profession of law.

vn.

THE LAW FACULTY

The faculty is a distinguished group of prison
guards who sit in attack formation at law school
assemblies. If you want to know what kind of
people law professors are, ask yourself this ques
tion: "What kind of a person would give up a
salary of a zillion dollars a year in a big firm to
drive a rusted-outFord Pintoand wear suitsmade
out of old horse blankets?" Think about this
carefully before asking your professor's opinion
on any subject
Politics areoften divisive at law schools. In the
1960's, the faculties were conservative and the
students were liberal. In the 1980's, the students
were conservative and the faculties were liberal.
The 1970's were a difficult transitional period
during which, foran awkward moment, faculties
and students were able to communicate. They
discovered that they did not like each other.
When law professors are not doing important
things like writing commercial outlines, they are
writing casebooks. Of course,they make youbuy
their casebooks fortheirclasses. Justto prove that
at heart they are reallygentle, fun-loving people,
professors will occasionally do something a little
bit zany, like wear a costume to classon Hallow
een. Before you laugh and cheer, you should
check your calendar. It is o ften difficult to tell
whether a professor is wearing a costume or not.
VDL THE SECOND AND THIRD YEARS

The second andthird years areabout the same
as the first year, except that you getto choose your
teachers (this iscalled forum shopping) based on
the difficulty of their grading curve. The profes
sors describe their courses in a list called,
appropriately enough,"Course Descriptions." An
honest list of course descriptions might look
something like this:
Civil Procedure. Learnabout thepaper warsof

litigation. Discover why, every time a case is
filed, another forest dies.
Constitutional Law. Ridicule people who still
believe that the Framers' intent has any rel
evance whatsoever.
Contracts. Study rules based on a model of
two-fisted negotiators with equal bargaining
power who dickerfreely, voluntarily agree on
all terms, and reduce their understanding to a
writing intended to embody their full agre e
ment. Leam that the last contract fitting this
model was signed in 1879.
Criminal Law. Study commonlaw crimesthat
haven't been the law anywhere for more than
100 years. Then, to bring things up to date,
study the Model Penal Code, which is not the
law anywhere today.
Criminal Procedure. Leam almost enough
about the rationale behind the exclusionary
rules to defend yourself at cocktail parties.
Environmental Law. Discoverwhy,ifyouput
an empty oil canto your ear, you can hear the
ocean roar.
Evidence. Memorize the hearsay rule and its
50,000 exceptions. Good for people with a
photographic memory and gangs offree time.
Income Taxation. Prepare to be a tax lawyer.
A tax lawyer is a person who is good with
numbers but who does not have enough per
sonality to be an accountant
legal Ethics/Professional Responsibility.
Leam why "honest lawyer" is an oxymoron.
Torts. Study acompensation system in which
the transaction costs generally exceed thepay
ments tothe injured parties. Fortunately, most
of the transaction costs occur in the form of
attorney's fees.
Wills and Estates. Dead people and their
things. Also known as "Stiffs and theirGifts."
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). How
people resolve disputes without lawyers, be
cause a simple dogbite case takes five years
and $50,000 to get to trial. Leam how to
recognize ADR and squash iL
IX. COCURRICULAR PROGRAMS AND
STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS

Being fully committed to providing the best
possible educational opportunities for every stu
dent, law schools offer cocurricular programs,
like law journals and moot court Then, quite
naturally, the y to hardly anyone participate in
them. Tie most elitist organization is d ie law
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review, which isgenerally restricted to the topten
percent of the class. These students are given this
special honor so that employers will not overlook
them just because they areat the top of their class.
Law review editors spend their time doing mean
ingful educational tasks like checking the citation
form of articles they don't understand.
Many law schools have alsostarted other law
journals. These journals usually focus on a spe
cific area of the law, and have names like The
Journal of Comparative Funeral La w. They
concentrate in a particular area so that they don't
have to be named The Second-String Law Re
view, which they would consider somewhat
demeaning.
There are alsostudent organizations. Some of
these ostensibly focus on a particular topic or
interest, like "Future Trial Attorneys for theClini
cally Brain Dead." However, they really exist
only to provide resume padding. A student wants
to be able to say that he is the Exalted Grand
Excellent Potentate of theAncientRoyal Order of
Back Benchers. This is supposed to impress
employers.
X.

INTERVIEWING FOR JOBS

Before you interview, you will need to prepare
a "resume." It is alsocalled a "curriculum vitae,"
a Latin phrase meaning "preposterous fab le."
Tfiere is a fine art to interpreting resumes. ' Top
10%" means "top 20%." 'Top 20%" means"top
half." "Middle ofthe class"means"bottomhalf."
Law schools get extremely angry what students
pad their resumes like this. They give moralistic
lectures telling students that it is just plain dishon
est Because they are the nation's leading law
schools, the twenty-five schools in the Top Ten
get particularly huffy aboutit One final sugges
tion: to avoid unwarranted federal interference,
take care not to send your resume through the
mails.
You should ask how many hours associates are
required to bill. I n some firms, associates bill as
many as 3,000 hours a year. Sometimes this is
accomplished through "triple billing," a tech
nique by which an associate works on client A's
matter while flying to a city for client B, and he
thinks that the issue may possibly somehow
someday be relevant toclient C. So he billseach
client full bore. It is also accomplished through a
time warp on the 14th floor, which allows associ
ates to bill fifteen hours in a ten-hour day.
(Continued on page 20)

PART II: WHAT THE "L" IS GOIN' ON
(Continued from page 20)
In any case, associates work very hard. One
student asked if the associates ever do anything
fun together. "Sure," the interviewer replied.
"About twoo'clock, weknock off for an hour and
go play a game of racquetball." The student
observed, "What a great way to break up the
afternoon." The interviewer responded, "After
noon?"
The definition ofa partner is a "self-employed
slave." Partners spend most of their lives squab
bling like a packof hyenas over the firm's profits.
You should not get discouraged, however. You
should remember that there are many joboppor
tunities and lots of different types of work that
lawyers do. For example:
Corporate Work: draftingdocumentsforscumsuckingcorporationsthat poisonhugenumbers
of innocent people.
Litigation: defending scumsucking individu
als whopoison afew innocent people at a time,
mostly because they lack the capital and tech
nology to poison huge numbers of innocent
people.
Public Interest Work: suing scumsucking
corporations that poison huge numbers of
innocent people. Lawyers doing this work
earn less than what the law firms on the other
side of the litigation pay their pencil sharpen
ers.
Weigh your options carefully!
XL

MAKING YOUR GETAWAY

Before you graduate, you take a test called the
"Professional Responsibil ity Exam." This test
asks you questions about ethics and morality. If
your answers reveal that you have the slightest
trace of a conscience remaining, you are sched
uled for surgery. Perhaps you have noticed that
many young lawyers wear sporty sweatbands on
their heads when they play racquetball. T hey do
this to hide the scar.
After you have graduated, you have to go
through an initiation rite called "Preparing for and
Taking the Bar Exam." The statebar association
says that bar exams are designed to ensure the
competency of the practicing bar. You learned
about them in your antitrust class, under the topic
of "Market Entry Barriers." They make it pos
sible for people who are already admitted to the
bar to make a livingwage (ie, about $200,000a
year). You will probably feel somewhat better
about the exam's rationale if you pass it
You will need to take an intensive, eight-week
course, costing atrillion dollars, to preparefor the
bar exam. Wait a minute, you say. Why did I

borrow ten trillion dollars and spend three years of
my life going to law school? Didn't law school
teach me the law? No, you idiot. Law school's
purpose is not to teach you the law. Law school
taught you toTHINK LIKE ALAWYER, unless
you attended one of theelite schools, then ittaught
you to think like a medieval philosopher, or a
business school dropout
Before you take the bar exam and become a
"full-fledged"2 lawyer, you must d o ate more
thing. You need to ask your law school dean to
write a letter recommending you for admission to
the bar. The dean's time isvery limited, since he
(or she) teaches a full three hours out of a fortyhour week. Your dean will probably send a
recommendation letter that looks like this:
(SEE LETTER IN ORIGINAL)
Since your dean took thetime from his (aher)
crushing schedule to write this tetter for you, he
must not be such a bad person after all. In fact,
from now on he (or she) will make you one of his
(or her) personal penpals. Throughout your entire
mortal existence, no matter where y our career
takes you, through all the ups and downs of life,
your dean will regularly write you thoughtful and
personally computer-generated tetters — asking
you for money. You just can't put a price on a
friendship like thaL Lie or she, however, d oes
have a ballpark figure in mind.
So nowyou know all there is to knowabout law
school. If you haven't yet decided whether to go
to lawschool, you should consider it carefully. If
you are in law school now, you should also
consider your options. But if you want my
objective, even-handed, carefully considered ad
vice, I'll tell you:
GET THE HEY OUT OF IT WHILE YOU
STILL CAN!

Edited By: WJ.O.

The Barrister would again like to thank the
Yale Law Journal for the authorization to
publish this edited version of Professor
Gordon's article which appeared in Yale's
April (Fool's) edition.
ENDNOTES
' Gordon, How Nol to Succeed in Law School, 100 Yale
L J. 1679.
2 As in "vulture." The principal difference between a
lawyer and a vulture is that the vulture doesn't take off its
wingtips.
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IS JUSTICE TRULY A
BLIND GODDESS?:
RACE, DISCRETION,
AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM.
Bias or prejudice is such an elusive condition
of the mind that it is most difficult, if not
impossible, to always recognize its exist
ence.1
Atop London's "Old Bailey " stands the
blind goddess of justice.1" Her bandaged eyes
and beveled scales serve as a testament to the
ideal that all persons, regardless of race, are
treated equally before the courts. Beyond
this idealism, however, lies the naked truth:
there are marked disparities in criminal sen
tencing and favorable parole decisions for
white and African-American criminal defen
dants. Is justice truly a blind goddess?
There are two main types of criminal sen
tencing in theUnited States: Determinateand
Indeterminate.2 Determinate sentencing is
based upon a philosophy of deterrence and
retribution. Parole is unlikely and criminal
defendants will usually serve out their entire
term.3 The focus of indeterminate sentencing
is on rehabilitating the defendanL A judge
will sentence a defendant to a range of years,
with the understanding of future release once
rehabilitation has been shown.4 Sentencing
in an indeterminate sentencing scheme is
subject to judicial discretion.5 In most cases
a judge will rely heavily on facts contained in
the defendant's pre-sentence report t o deter
mine a sentence.6 The pre-sentence report
reveals information about the defendants
crime, past criminal record, education, em
ployment record, family status and even
sexual orientation.6* Indeterminate sentences
are thus deemed to fit each individual defen
dants needs, and judges are not required to
state the reasons for a particular sentence.7
Statistical studies of racial disparities in
sentencing and parole decisions indicate the
disparities exists between African-American
and white criminal defendants in various
parts of the United States.8 This occurs not
only in sentencing but in prison populations
and in the actual amount of time served.8"
Researchers have devised various explana
tions for this occurrence. Some suggest that
minority offenders serve disproportionately
(Continued on page 21)
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(Continued from page 21)
larger prison terms because their cases are
less often disposed of through plea bargains.9
Another explanation is the pre-sentence re
port; researchers have discovered that
African-American criminal defendants are
more likely to possess characteristics that
indicate the potential for recidivism. These
include chronic unemployment, unstable
families, and lengthy prior criminal records
that result in disfavorable treatment.10 Re
searchers argue that the mere fact a
disproportionate number of minority cases
are disposed of more severely than white
criminal defendants cannot be prima facie
proof of racial discrimination. Yet, still
others argue that the system is infested with
widespread racial discrimination due to the
gross discretionary decision making ability
of j udges and parole boards.11
Whatever explanation one chooses to ac
cept, it is important to note that the federal
courts have not wholly ignored this problem.
Congress adopted the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (FSG) which were put into effect
in 1988 and 1989.12 These guidelines were a
response to the inconsistency of sentences
for similar conduct by similar defendants.
The FSG were designed to eliminate the
disparate sentences that were a consequence
of unfettered discretion of district court
judges, and replace them with fair and "sci
entific" determinate sentences devised by an
independent administrative agency.13
Before the FSG judges were free to rely
on individual philosophies of punishment, or
their view of a particular offender. The
reasons for a sentence were often poorly
articulated; there was little or no appellate
review; and the judges were of a mindset that
the parole system was the place in which to
correct errors.14 Opponents to FSG however,
reason that sentencing has now been reduced
to a mere computation and discretion has
moved into the hands of the prosecutor. They
argue, for example, that it is the prosecutor
who dictates the quantity of drugs that will be
charged to acriminal defendant. The amount
of drugs charged will determine calculation
of the FSG "score" which in turn controls the
overall severity of the sentence.15
A troubling aspect regarding parole board
decisions is that they are "closed door" pro
ceedings. It is extremely difficult for a
prisoner to gather information tending to

show discriminatory practices. Moreover,
even when prisoners are able to gather infor
mation tending to show racial bias, at least
one court has found the evidence insuffi
cient. In Inmates v. Greenholtz,l6the. Eighth
Circuit held that neither ethnocentric deci
sion making nor racial slurs uttered during
parole board deliberations were convincing
evidence of racial discrimination.
Even if one concludes that the criminal
justice system is fraught with discretionary
abuse, a solution to the problem is largely
unclear. However, in order to reduce, at the
very least, the potential for discretionary
abuse, all states should provide for a strict
standard of review for all parole board deci
sions. The cloak and dagger secrecy that
often shrouds the decision making process
creates an environment where abuse can
occur. Some suggest that one way to eradi
cate discrimination is to shift the burden of
proof to the parole review board, or institute
parole release guidelines.17
In Castaneda v. Partida,l*lht Supreme
Court devised a burden-shifting test in re
sponse to claims of racial discrimination in
grand jury venires. The court held that to
raise a presumption of intentional discrimi
nation defendants must meet two
requirements. First, the defendants must
show that they are members of a cognizable
racial group. Second, defendants mustprove
that the legal procedure employed, unfavor
ably affected a disproportionately higher
number of their group's members. Only if
this two prong test is met does the burden
shift to the state to show non-discriminatory
reasons for this occurrence This reasoning is
sound. At first glance it appears that the
parole board would be unfairly burdened by
a presumption of racial discrimination. The
presumption however, can be rebutted by the
production of all pertinent criteria that went
into the decision making process— includ
ing past criminal conduct and behavior
patterns. This type of burden will force
parole boards to be detailed and systematic
when evaluating each individual prisoner.
The crux of this issue is nql that discre
tionary decisions are being made; it is the
level of discretion officials hold, and the lack
of an adequate checks and balances system
once a decision is made. Criminal defen
dants are not only innocent unless proven
guilty, they are alsoentitled to a fair and luci
d
sentence absent bias or prejudice. Whatever
the truth about racial discrimination within
the criminal justice system is, it is fair to say
that discretionary decision making has the

potential for unfair treatment. Placing limits
on discretion, or abolishing it entirely would
be a movement toward insuring equal justice
for all.

By: Robert L. Lambright
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